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THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE NINTH SESSION (1980)
By Bernard H. Oxman*
I. INTRODUCTION**
The ninth session of the Third -United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea met in New York from February 27 to April 4, and in Geneva
from July 28 to August 29, 1980. In addition, the Drafting Committee met
for 3 weeks in June in New York.'
At the end of the New York part of the session, the leadership2 issued
a second revision of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT/Rev.
2). 3 At the resumed session, the text was revised again by the leadership
4
and issued as the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text)
before the session closed.- The issuance of both texts was preceded by de-
bate in Plenary on the textual revisions proposed by the various chairmen.
The general perception was that the new informal text of the Draft Con-
vention brings a decade of informal negotiation closer to completion. The
conference had decided earlier, however, to defer further consideration of
three important matters to the tenth session: (1) completion of the resolution
setting up a commission to prepare for the establishment of the Inter-
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. United States Representative and
Vice Chairman of the U.S. delegation, and Chairman of the English Language Group of the
Drafting Committee, at the ninth session of the Law of the Sea Conference. The views ex-
pressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Depart-
ment of State, the U.S. Government, or the English Language Group or Drafting Committee
of the conference.
** This article was completed prior to the issuance of the following statement by the
Department of State on March 2, 1981:
After consultations with the other interested Departments and Agencies of the United
States Go% ernment, the Secretary of State has instructed our representative to the UN Law
of the Sea Conference to seek to ensure that the negotiations do not end at the present
session of the Conference, pending a policy review by the United States Government.
The interested Departments and Agencies have begun studies of the serious problems
raised by the Draft Convention, and these will be the subject of a thorough review which
will determine our position toward the negotiations.
'This article is a sequel to Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of the Sea
Conference, 68 AJIL 1 (1974); The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
1974 Caracas Session, 69 AJIL 1 (1975);-The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AJIL 763 (1975);
and Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York
Ses in, 71 AJIL 247 (1977);-The 1977 New York Sessions, 72 AJIL 57 (1978);-The Seventh
Session (1978), 73 AJIL I (1979);-The Eighth Session (1979), 74 AJIL 1 (1980).
,The procedure is set forth in UN Doc. AICONF.62/62 (1978), 10 THIRD UN CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW oF THE SEA, OFFICIAL RECORDS 6 (1978) [hereinafter cited as OFF. REc.], dis-
cussed at 73 AJIL 3-5 and 74 AJIL 2.
SUN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.2 (1980).
Following the same procedure. See note 2 supra.
UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.3, and Add.1 and Corrs. 1-6 (1980) [hereinafter
referred to in the text as the Draft Convention and in notes as DC(IT)].
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national Sea-Bed Authority and to draft its provisional rules, regula-
tions, and procedures (the Preparatory Commission);6 (2) protection upon
entry into force of the Convention for investments in seabed mining made
prior to entry into force of the Convention (generally referred to as prepa-
ratory investment protection); 7 and (3) determining what entities, in addi-
tion to states, may become party to the Convention (participation). In addi-
tion, some more work was contemplated on delimitation of the economic zone
and continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts.,
In light of the progress made at the ninth session, the conference
scheduled 7 weeks of work for the Drafting Committee followed by a 6- or
7-week session of the conference itself in hopes of completing the final
text of the Convention in 1981. A session would then be held in Caracas for
signature, statements for the record, and other formalities.
Efforts were made by all concerned to ensure that the enactment of deep
seabed mining legislation by the United States9 and the Federal Republic of
Germany10 would not divert the resumed ninth session from completing
work on the Convention. Thus, on the first day the Group of 77 made a
strongly worded statement condemning such legislation, to which the
United States and the Federal Republic responded, t" and other delegations
also made statements; but all attempted to avoid a lengthy rehashing of
already familiar arguments.
While it may be that enactment of the legislation had an impact on some
aspects of the negotiations (such as the decision to defer consideration of
preparatory investment protection), in general it was not allowed to inter-
fere with the negotiating process. This may be partly because the U.S.
delegation made clear that its negotiating objectives had not changed from
what they had been at the first part of the ninth session, and partly be-
cause the U.S. legislation deferred full-scale commercial mining until Janu-
ary 1, 1988, which allows time for the Convention to enter into force first.
A serious obstacle to completion in the near future of a Convention that
can be widely accepted is the idea that it will be possible to resolve an im-
portant issue-be it one of those still outstanding or any other-by
voting during formal proceedings. No better textual evidence of this can be
found than the footnote to the new Article 309 prohibiting reservations
that are not expressly permitted by another article: it begins, "This article
is based on the assumption that the Convention is adopted by consensus."
In effect, the footnote qualifies every article of the Draft Convention. Vot-
ing on any element of the "package deal" is likely to cause general collapse.
6 The report of the President regarding work on the Preparatory Commission is contained
in UN Doc. AICONF.62/L.55 and Corr.1 (1980). The resumed ninth session deferred
consideration of the matter.
7The U.S. proposal on the subject is set forth in Conf. Doc. IA/1 (1980).
"See DC(IT) Arts. 74, 83, 121, and 309.
' Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (1980),
reprinted in 19 ILM 1003 (1980).
10 Act on Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining, in force Aug. 17, 1980, [1980] BGBI.I
1429, reprinted in 19 ILM 1330 (1980).
11 The debate took place on July 28, 1980. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.121 (1980).
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The author discussed this problem in greater detail in reporting on the
eighth session.
12
In this connection, the Convention may be most threatened by efforts
to hold it hostage to political objectives outside the scope of the conference,
as reflected in the polemical "transitional provision" regarding de-
pendencies and occupied areas that appears after the text of the Conven-
tion and in proposals to allow liberation movements to become party to the
Convention. Nothing will be achieved by pressing either objective. If the
proponents prevail at the conference, there will be no widely accepted
Convention to legitimize or implement their pyrrhic victory. The only
winners would be those who hope to block widespread acceptance of the
Convention but may be unable or unwilling to do so directly.
The new texts on deep seabed mining are legion; they are an enormous
achievement, capping 3 years of work since the issuance of the ICNT 13
and the near collapse of the conference. These texts, however, have not al-
layed all concerns regarding the deep seabed mining regime. Reluctance
to reopen the texts to consideration at this stage is understandable. Never-
theless, the fact that protection for investments made prior to the entry into
force of the Convention remains to be dealt with may provide a useful
opportunity to ease some of the remaining concerns of potential deep sea-
bed producers. It would be a shame if ideology stood in the way of
arriving at practical arrangements that could enhance the prospects for rati-
fication and early entry into force of the Convention.14 Failure to give rea-
sonable assurances in the Convention will not prevent mining outside the
Convention; it will only increase the chances that such mining will occur.
II. THE FIRST COMMITTEE: DEEP SEABED MINING
The major achievement of the ninth session was the emergence of a
generally advanced basis for accommodation on deep seabed mining. The
Draft Convention in effect continues the process begun with the first re-
vision of the ICNT.15
Many of the remaining noninstitutional issues were considered at length
during the first part of the ninth session. Results were reflected in the ICNT/
Rev.2. The second part of the session was devoted in large measure to the
central feature of the institutional problem: voting in the Council of the
Sea-Bed Authority. A number of remaining noninstitutional problems were
also addressed. In order to assess the more important of the many textual
changes, it may be useful first to review briefly the elements of the package
deal regarding seabed mining that emerged from the proposals made by
Secretary of State Kissinger in 1976.
The crux of the settlement is the system of exploration and exploitation.
The objective of the "parallel system" is to give states and private companies
'! 74 AJIL 46-47.
'- Informal Composite Negotiating Text, 8 OFF. REC., UN Doc. AICONF.62/WP.10 and
Add.1 (1977), reprinted in 16 ILM 1108 (1977).
14See 73 AJIL at 32 n. 11 regarding the ideological question.
15 ICNT/Rev. 1, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.1 (1979), reprinted in 18 ILM 686 (1979).
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sponsored by states on the one hand, and the new international Enterprise
(the commercial mining arm of the Sea-Bed Authority) and its partners on
the other hand, a genuine opportunity to mine the deep seabeds. Thus, a
state or private applicant for a mine site must propose two sites, one of
which would be "reserved" for mining by the Enterprise or developing
countries. The Enterprise would have the right to obtain mining technology
under fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions fro:mn state and
private miners if such technology is found not to be obtainable on the
open market.
All mining would generate revenues for distribution by the Authority to
developing countries, partly in the form of payments proportional to pro-
duction and profits paid by miners on the "nonreserved side," and partly
in revenues from the Enterprise.
One element of the settlement is that the parallel system would become
subject to review after about 20 years. A further element is an interim
limitation on the rate of expansion of production of minerals from seabed
nodules (as well as provision for direct assistance to developing land-based
producers to be drawn from the Authority's revenues); thus, land-based
producers of these minerals would be afforded protection against sudden
and extreme alterations in supply from this new source in proportion to
aggregate world demand.
The new International Sea-Bed Authority would administer the system
and adopt necessary nondiscriminatory ground rules, including regulations
regarding such matters as environmental protection and safety. However,
the Authority would not have the broad discretionary powers associated
with some regulatory agencies in the United States or other countries. It
would not have discretionary power to control entry, assign markets, fix
prices, or otherwise intervene in opposition to market forces. The effort to
ensure that the Authority could not do these things indirectly explains many
aspects of the negotiations, particularly the emphasis on specificity in the
allocation of functions to organs of the Authority, protection for market
economy countries in the decision-making procedures of the Council, and
compulsory and binding third-party settlement of disputes.
Much of the negotiation regarding the system of exploitation was de-
signed to ensure that each "side" of the parallel system was given a fair
opportunity to succeed. Supporters of the "private side" feared that the
Enterprise would be given decisive advantages by the Sea-Bed Authority,
and therefore sought to restrain the potential for disincentives to mining
on the "private side." Supporters of the Enterprise feared monopoly con-
trol of technology by states and private companies that oppose the Enter-
prise, and therefore sought to ensure that the Enterprise would receive
the necessary capital and technology to function independently or to bar-
gain from strength in making joint arrangements. Some delegations en-
deavored to redirect this negative approach to the problem of balance into
a positive one by giving each "side" some interest in promoting (or at least
not frustrating) the success of the other.
Complicating this process were conflicting (but understandably cautious)
assumptions about the nature of the interests likely to dominate the Sea-
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Bed Authority and the mining system. For potential seabed mining coun-
tries, a basic concern was to prevent extremist ideologues and land-based
producers from combining to use the various powers of the Sea-Bed Author-
ity to restrain private mining. For land-based producers and developing
countries, a basic concern was to prevent the private companies of a few
countries from dominating both sides of the parallel system, preempting
competition, and using the international status of the Enterprise as the
spearhead of efforts to gain artificial competitive advantages for seabed
mining relative to land-based mining."
Against this background, a necessarily brief exposition of the results of
the ninth session regarding part XI of the text and the relevant annexes
might focus on the list of outstanding issues set forth by the author at the
end of the eighth session.1
7
1. Article 140: sharing of benefits with "peoples who have not attained full
independence or other self-governing status"
While the text of Article 140 has not been changed, the rules, regulations,
and procedures implementing it must be approved by both the Assembly
and the Council of the Authority, the latter functioning by consensus."8
2. Article 150: making clear that the provisions on policies relating to activities
in the Area shall be implemented as specifically provided in this part
The words "as specifically provided in this Part" have been added to the
chapeau of Article 150. This makes clear that Article 150 does not contain
a separate set of requirements regarding seabed mining or a separate grant
of power to implement the policies it sets forth, but rather contains a set
of policy objectives for states parties and competent organs of the Authority
in exercising the specific powers and functions conferred on each of them by
other articles.
The list of policies has been augmented to include "the development of
the common heritage for the benefit of mankind as a whole" as an inde-
pendent objective.' 9
3. Article 151: agreement on the numbers in the production ceiling
The ICNT/Rev.1 specified a limitation on nickel production for an
interim period of, at most, 20 years from the time deep seabed commercial
1 This concern even applies to some industrial states like the USSR and France that feel
they may not be among the first and largest seabed mining countries.
17 74 AJIL 6-7.
1, DC(IT) Arts. 160(2)(f)(i), 161(7)(d), and 162(2)(n)(i). The same decision-making pro-
cedures also apply to the implementation by the Authority of Article 82, paragraph 4 on the
distribution of payments to developing states parties in respect of mineral exploitation of the
continental shelf seaward of 200 miles.
19 Agreement on this consumer-oriented policy was made possible by including an addi-
tional policy that conditions of market access for imports of deep seabed minerals "shall not be
more favourable than the most favourable applied to imports from other sources." While there
was discussion of broader prohibitions on subsidies, the technical difficulties encountered were
considerable.
1981]
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production began.2 0 For any given year, the overall production ceiling was to
be projected on the basis of the total increase in annual nickel consumption
for the 5 years prior to the commencement of commercial production from
the deep seabeds, plus 60 percent of the increase in nickel21 consumption
thereafter.
2
Industrialized countries were concerned about the effect of the interim
production limitation in periods of low growth. They felt that the produc-
tion ceiling should not be permitted to drop below a certain minimum, 23 lest it
have serious inhibiting effects on investment. The minimum ceiling
would therefore be calculated as if the annual increase in nickel
consumption were 3 percent, provided the resulting ceiling does not for any
given year exceed the total projected increase in nickel consumption.
2 4
Provision is also made for annual variations in production levels at the dis-
cretion of the miner, and for obtaining a supplementary production
authorization for more substantial or sustained increases in production.25
The ICNT/Rev.1 reflected the generally accepted principle that once a
plan of work containing planned production levels was approved, the Au-
thority could not impose a change in the production levels permitted in that
plan of work. The new text preserves that principle, but moves the date of
computation closer to the date the miner plans to begin commercial
production.
2 6
The text2 7 also provides that the
Authority shall issue a production authorization for the level of
production applied for [by the operator] unless the sum of that level
and the levels already authorized exceeds the nickel production ceiling,
as calculated . . . in the year of issuance of the authorization, during
any year of planned production falling within the interim period
[during which the nickel production ceiling is in effect].
This "split contracting system" permits a miner to obtain his contract first
and production authorization later. By separating the two procedures, it
avoids artificial pressure to compete prematurely for portions of the pro-
duction ceiling, reduces the risk that investment in exploration will be lost
2 See Art. 151 of ICNT/Rev.I, Rev.2, and DC(IT).
21 For economic and technical reasons, a limit on nickel production would affect overall
production of other metals in the polymetallic nodules (copper, cobalt, and manganese). Rules
and regulations can be adopted to ensure that the relevant proportions of production of other
metals from nodules are not exceeded. DC(IT) Art. 151, para. 2(f).
22 The projections are derived from "trend lines" based on the most recent 15-year period
for which actual nickel consumption data are available. Id., para. 2(b). These trend lines are
computed for each plan of work at the time the production authorization is issued for that
site, which may not be more than 5 years prior to the start of commercial production under
that plan of work.
23 This minimum was called a "floor," a misunderstood term. It is neither a mintmum guaran-
teed level of seabed production nor a minimum guaranteed market share for seabed produc-
tion, but rather a minimum limit on the ceiling for seabed production.
24 DC(IT) Art. 151, para. 2(b)(iv). 251d.. para. 2(e).
26 A maximum of 5 years before commercial production begins is specified.
27 DC(IT) Art. 151, para 2.
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because production needs to be deferred, and permits more timely com-
putation of the ceiling for issuing a production authorization for each miner.
The ICNT/Rev. 1 reflected general agreement that the Authority should
have the right to participate in commodity conferences dealing with com-
modities produced from resources of the deep seabeds."8 The new text pro-
hibits the Authority from taking part in an unbalanced forum by making
participation by "all interested parties including both producers and con-
sumers" a condition of participation by the Authority. 29 Over time, this pro-
vision might act as a restraint on possible attempts to form a cartel even if
some seabed producers come to regard such an arrangement with favor.
The text was also amended to emphasize that the basis of the Authority's
participation, including possible voting power, is left to the rules of pro-
cedure of the organs established by the particular commodity agreement.30
4. Article 155, paragraph 6: the moratorium
Review of the system of exploitation after some 20 years was a basic ele-
ment of the package under negotiation. Since the review conference was
designed to allay developing countries' concerns that they might be agreeing
to a system that might not turn out to be in their long-range interests, the
question of incentives for seabed mining countries to negotiate at the re-
view conference arose.
At the suggestion of various developing country representatives, the
ICNT/Rev. 1 provided that if the review conference could not reach agree-
ment on the system of exploration and exploitation within 5 years, the
Assembly of the Authority could decide that "no new contracts or plans
of work for activities in the Area shall be approved" pending such agree-
ment." The industrialized states rejected the idea that a moratorium was an
appropriate alternative to agreement.
The compromise reached eliminates the power to impose a moratorium.
As an alternative, it permits two-thirds of the parties in effect to revive a pro-
cedural situation similar to that which exists now: they may insist that a
different system of exploitation is an essential element of any convention
on the law of the sea, and others may decide whether they wish to be
parties to it under such circumstances. Thus, if agreement is not reached on
the system of exploration and exploitation within 5 years, the review con-
ference may adopt amendments to the system by a two-thirds vote; these
amendments would enter into force for all parties 1 year after being ratified
by two-thirds of the states parties.3 2 The 1-year delay corresponds to the 1-
year notice required for states to denounce the Convention. 3 The amend-
' ICNT Art. 151, para. I. 29 DC(IT) Art. 151, para. 1.
DC(IT) Art. 151, para. 1 specifies that the Authority's participation is "in respect of pro-
duction in the Area," rather than "in respect of the production in the Area" as in the ICNT/
Rev. 1 (emphasis added).
1CNT/Rev.1 Art. 155, para. 6. 31 DC(IT) Art. 155, para. 4.
" DC(IT) Art. 317. It is assumed that the United States would denounce the Convention if a
new s stem of exploration and exploitation that the United States had not ratified were to
enter into force.
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ments may not in any event affect rights acquired under existing con-
tracts.34
The expansion of global dependence on seabed minerals, as well as the
mere existence of the Convention for 20 years, is likely to promote restraint
among all concerned. Any substantial revision over the objection of major
consuming or seabed mining countries would effectively destroy both the
moral and practical significance of any possible argument that exploitation
outside the Treaty is impermissible.
5. Article 161: voting in the Council (including Article 162, paragraph 2(j))
Voting in the Council of the Sea-Bed Authority was the most difficult issue
addressed by the ninth session of the conference.
Composition. The question of the composition of the Council was regarded
as largely settled by the earlier texts. It is clearly linked, of course, to the
issue of voting.
The 36 members of the Council must include:
(a) Four members from among the eight States Parties which have the
largest investments in preparation for and in the conduct of activities in
the Area, either directly or through their nationals, including at least
one State from the Eastern (Socialist) European region;
(b) Four members from among those States Parties which, during the
last five years for which statistics are available, have either consumed
more than two per cent of total world consumption or have had net
imports of more than two per cent of total world imports of the com-
modities produced from the categories of minerals to be derived from
the Area, and in any case one State from the Eastern (Socialist) Euro-
pean region;
(c) Four members from among countries which on the basis of
production in areas under theirjurisdiction are major net exporters of
the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, including at
least two developing countries whose exports of such minerals have a
substantial bearing upon their economies;
(d) Six members from among developing States, representing special
interests. The special interests to be represented shall include those of
States with large populations, States which are land-locked or geo-
graphically disadvantaged, States which are major importers of the
categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, State,& which are
potential producers of such minerals, and least developed States.3 5
Furthermore, the 18 members "elected according to the principle of ensur-
ing an equitable geographical distribution of seats in the Council as a whole"
must include at least one member from each geographical region: "Africa,
Asia, Eastern Europe (Socialist), Latin America and Western Europe and
others."
36
4 DC(IT) Art. 155, para 5. 3- ICNT/Rev.1 and DC(IT) Art. 161, para. 1.
"Ibid. The general expectation is that the six non-Communist seats in categories (a) and (b)
will be filled by the United States, Japan, and four Western European countries (probably
[Vol. 75
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The new text provides that each group seated on the Council "is repre-
sented by those members, if any, which are nominated by the group.
37
This text was added primarily to ensure the representative character of the
substantive interest groups referred to in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c)
of Article 16 1(1). There would have been no need for such special provision
for regional group members alone, given the United Nations custom (fol-
lowed at the conference and in UN organs generally) of deferring to the
nominees of the regional groups, if any, in such situations.
Voting. The basic voting issue was whether Western seabed mining coun-
tries could be reasonably assured that decisions, at least on the more impor-
tant matters, could not be made over their objection. The question there-
fore became one of blocking votes.
Two approaches were generally considered. Both dealt with requirements
additional to the numerical percentage requirements for making decisions,
be it two-thirds or three-fourths. The first was a two-tiered approach under
which substantive decisions required a two-thirds affirmative vote in the
Council (including an absolute majority of its members), provided that with
respect to the more important of these questions a fixed number of states
did not cast negative votes.3 8 The second approach would have substituted
for the blocking vote of a fixed number of states a requirement that the
Council majority include states representing 50 percent of the total con-
sumption and 50 percent of the total production (on land and offshore)
by all states parties of minerals belonging to the categories of minerals
produced from the deep seabeds. Thus, the second approach would have
provided a blocking vote for the major consumers and producers.
including the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom). Noting the
possibility that category (c) may include major Western exporters (such as Canada), Sweden
and some other Western countries that may not qualify for these categories believe they are
at a disadvantage in seeking election to the Council if the criterion is not equitable geographic
distribution from among all those elected outside any particular category, but equitable geo-
graphical distribution of seats in the Council "as a whole." Because of their proportionately
large contributions to financing the Enterprise, they believe they should have a better chance of
being represented on the Council than the traditional allocation of seats among UN regional
groups is likely to yield.
While sympathetic to such arguments, the United States and other delegations were forced
to assume that any effort to require more Western seats on the Council would stimulate de-
mands for a general expansion to add "proportional" numbers of other seats. Undesirable
even in principle, the expansion could unacceptably dilute the protection afforded major sea-
bed mining states by various voting provisions. Accordingly, they opposed the change.
Needless to say, the problem was presented as if the term "equitable geographical distri-
bution" were to be applied without regard to the particular context of this Convention.
It also proceeded on the assumption that a particularly important role is not envisaged in
the administration of the Enterprise for technologically advanced Western consumer coun-
tries lacking substantial independent seabed mining or land-based producer interests. In
reality, at least one of the assumptions is likely to be inaccurate.
3 DC(IT) Art. 161, para. 2(c).
This approach was incorporated in principle in the WG21 report issued at the end of the
eighth session. Report on negotiations held by the Chairman and the Co-ordinators of the
Working Group of 21, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/91, at 16 (1979) (setting forth UN Doc.
A/CON F.62/C. 1/L.26 (1979).
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The strong ideological opposition of the African Group and others to
"weighted voting" made negotiation on the second approach difficult
even though it is not a weighted voting formula as such.
39
Negotiation on the basis of the first formula produced a complex stale-
mate among the three groups principally concerned. The major Western
deep seabed mining countries refused to accept a result that did not
give them a blocking vote (no more than five or six votes to block). Even
if they would have agreed to the Western position in the end, the develop-
ing countries refused to accept a blocking number low enough to give the
Eastern European countries an independent blocking vote (three or four
votes to block). Finally, the Soviet Union refused to agree to the concept
of a blocking vote if it would give blocking power to the Wester;a countries
but not to the East European countries. 0
The resultant compromise is a three-tiered voting system for mbstantive
issues.4 1
(1) For those issues where special voting protection for minority interests
is unlikely to be needed, decisions require a two-thirds majority of the
Council members present and voting.
(2) For those decisions requiring additional assuranceof broad support, a
three-fourths majority of the Council members present and voting is re-
quired. Decisions in this category are generally executive or operational
(occasionally even ministerial) rather than legislative or rule making in
nature. They are the kind thatjudges-whatever their legal background-
have little difficulty reviewing for compatibility with relevant legal require-
ments (in this case, the provisions of the Convention, the rules, regulations,
and procedures, and the terms of contracts).
The requisite majority of members present and voting must in both cases
include the affirmative votes of at least a majority of the members of the
Council, i.e., at least 19 affirmative votes.
(3) The "implementation of its functions as prescribed in Part XI" is ef-
fected by the Authority by the adoption and uniform application of "rules,
regulations and procedures."' The essence of the voting settlement is that
the adoption of "rules, regulations and procedures" by the Authority re-
quires a consensus in the Council.4 3 Consensus is also required to adopt
-" The African ideological position might have been less rigid had the Africz.n land-based
producers devoted more attention to their voting power.
40 Abortive attempts were made by some delegates to break the impasse by finding alterna-
tive means to deal with the Soviet problem, such as blocking power for a unanimous regional
group. Developing countries rejected any such veto for a single regional group in light of their
opposition in principle to approaches analogous to the right of veto in the UN Security
Council.
41 DC(IT) Art. 161, para. 7.
42 Ann. III, Art. 17, para. 1. It is in this manner that the detailed requirements for ex-
ploration and exploitation not set forth in the Convention itself (or in its annexes) are elaborated
and changed. A detailed list of some of these, and relevant criteria, is contained in Annex
III, Art. 17. Agreement on the consensus rule was accompanied by agreement that the list
is not exhaustive. The words "inter alia" were added to the chapeau. The Draft Convention
also adds general subject matter criteria for, and unifies the provisions on approval of, rules,
regulations, and procedures. DC(IT) Arts. 160, para. 2(f) and 162, para. 2(n).
13 DC(IT) Art. 161, para. 7(d), (f), and (g).
[Vol. 75
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
amendments, to take measures to protect land-based producers of minerals,
to determine the voting majority needed for any decision for which the Con-
vention does not specify the requisite majority, and to decide that a lesser
majority is sufficient if a question arises as to whether the requisite majority
needed to make a decision is consensus. For these purposes, "'consensus'
means the absence of any formal objection."44
A consensus system, of course, protects all concerned against adverse
decisions. However, it does not protect against adverse failure to make a
decision." To the extent the Convention requires that a decision be made,
the problem may be reduced in part by the specificity of the requirement
and in part because dispute settlement procedures would be available.
Nevertheless, two basic prerequisites for mining to occur under the Con-
vention necessitated special attention in light of this problem.
First, in the absence of necessary rules, regulations, and procedures, it
would not be possible for the mining system to operate. Thus, the provi-
sion in the final clauses that the "rules, regulations and procedures drafted
by the Preparatory Commission shall apply provisionally pending their for-
mal adoption by the Authority in accordance with Part XI"46 is clearly an
integral aspect of the First Committee's settlement.
The second problem concerns approval of plans of work (contracts) for
exploration and exploitation. If approval of a plan of work requires Council
review, how does one reconcile the objective nature of the contracting sys-
tem set forth in immense detail in the Convention with the political charac-
ter of a Council that intentionally includes some members whose immedi-
ate national interests may not be served by seabed mining?
Article 162(2) (j) of the ICNT dealt with the problem by specifying that
the "'plan of work shall be deemed to have been approved unless a decision
to disapprove it is taken within 60 days of its submission by the Technical
Commission." The text proposed in the report of the Working Group of 21
issued at the end of the eighth session47 and repeated in the ICNT/Rev.2
substantially changed this procedure by providing that "a plan of work shall
be deemed to have been approved unless a proposal for its approval or dis-
approval has been voted upon within . . . 60 days." This change was
rejected by the Western seabed mining states.
Under the Draft Convention, the applicable procedure in the Council
depends upon the recommendation of the Legal and Technical Commis-
sion. The Commission is required to "submit appropriate recommendations
to the Council" on plans of work, and to "base its recommendations solely
on the grounds stated in annex III," in a detailed report. 8 Its decision-mak-
"' Art. 161, para. 7(e). When it is apparent that there will be a formal objection to a pro-
posal, provision is made for ad hoc conciliation committees composed of Council members that
are to endeavor to work out a proposal that can be adopted by consensus. Ibid.
Except perhaps indirectly through the bargaining process.
*" DC(IT) Art. 308, para. 4. " Note 38 supra.
4H DC(IT) Art. 165, para. 2(b). Annex III, Article 6(3) requires approval of plans of work
that -conform to the uniform and non-discriminatory requirements established by the rules,
regulations and procedures of the Authority, unless": (1) a previous miner has received or is
being considered for a plan of work for part of the area applied for; (2) part of the area ap-
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ing procedures will be specified in the rules, regulations, and procedures of
the Authority; 49 the matter will thus be taken up by the Preparatory
Commission.
If the Commission recommends Council approval, after about a month
for ad hoc conciliation if necessary, "the plan of work shall be deemed to
have been approved by the Council unless the Council disapproves it by
consensus." The "State or States, if any, making the application or spon-
soring the applicant" are excluded from the deliberations on whether there
is a consensus to disapprove the plan.50 If, on the other hand, the Commis-
sion recommends the disapproval of a plan of work or does not make a
recommendation, then a three-fourths majority is necessary for Council
approval.51
6. Article 188: providing access to commercial arbitration for contractual disputes
Article 188 of the ICNT/Rev. 1 provided for submission of disputes under
a contract or plan of work to commercial arbitration insofar as provided in
a contract between the parties. The new text requires that such disputes
be submitted, "at the request of any party to the dispute, to binding com-
mercial arbitration" unless otherwise agreed by the parties.52 The arbitral
tribunal may deal with disputes concerning the interpretation or application
of the contract, but may not directly decide a question it identifies
as one of interpretation of the Convention itself. Accordingly, provisions
protecting the rights of the operator are likely to be included in the con-
tract itself even if those rights might in any event be protected by the
Convention.
7. Annex 11,53 Article 4: sponsorship where nationality and control are separated
The ICNT/Rev. 1 left in doubt how divisions between nationality and con-
trol of an applicant would be identified and handled.
The Draft Convention specifies that sponsorship of an applicant by the
state of nationality is sufficient:
(1) "unless the applicant has more than one nationality, as in the case
of a partnership or consortium of entities from several States, in which
event all States Parties involved shall sponsor the application"; or
(2) "unless the applicant is effectively controlled by another
State Party or its nationals, in which event both States Parties shall
sponsor the application.'
54
plied for has been disapproved by the Council for mining because of serious environmental
risks; or (3) the sponsoring state would thereby exceed the antimonopoly limits.
'9 DC(IT) Art. 163, para. 11. oDC(IT) Art. 162, para. 2(j)(i).
51 DC(IT) Art. 162, para. 2(j)(ii).
5' In the absence of agreement to the contrary, and unless others are prescribed by the
rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority, the UNCITRAL rules apply.
5Annex II of the ICNT/Rev. 1 became Annex III of the ICNT/Rev.2 and the DC(IT)
as amended.
5DC(IT) Ann. III, Art. 4, para. 2,
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The rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority will set forth "the
criteria and procedures for implementation of the sponsorship require-
ments."55 In this connection, the Convention specifies that the duty of a
sponsoring state to ensure compliance with the Convention is fulfilled if it
adopts laws and regulations and takes administrative measures
"which are, within the framework of its legal system, reasonably appropriate
for securing compliance by persons under its jurisdiction.
56
These provisions were not written in connection with, or in derogation
of, the provisions of part VII of the Convention with respect to the nation-
ality of ships and the duties of the flag state, and of part XII with respect
to pollution from ships. The flag state and the sponsoring state, if different,
are presumably obliged to avoid interfering with each other's fulfillment of
relevant obligations within their respective spheres of primary concern.5 7
8. Annex II,5S Article 5 on technology transfer: the Brazil clause, time limits,
dispute settlement recourse for third-party owners, and avoidance of
warranty implications
The technology transfer provisions have been reorganized and redrafted
to avoid several problems with the earlier text. Among the more important
changes are:
e The obligation of miners to transfer seabed mining technology
they use to the Enterprise on fair and reasonable commercial terms and
conditions, if it is not available on the open market, ends 10 years after
the Enterprise begins commercial production. 9 While the United
States and others sought a shorter period than 10 years, the compro-
mise included assurances by the developing countries that they will no
longer press for the transfer of processing technology.
* The new text eliminates a provision on blacklisting of a third-party
owner of technology who refuses to honor his assurance to transfer to
the Enterprise, on fair and reasonable commercial terms and condi-
tions, technology he owns that is used by the miner and is not generally
available on the open market.
6 0
* In cases of third-party ownership of technology used by a miner,
a duty is placed on the miner to obtain the right to transfer technology
"whenever it is possible to do so without substantial cost to" him, a
particularly relevant situation being "cases where there is a substantial
5 Ibid. 6 Id., para. 3.
57 A more interesting question perhaps is the influence the ideas contained in this new article
and its implementing regulations may have in the future on the application of the concept of
"genuine link" not only to ships but in general, and the relevance to other efforts to find
fair and effective jurisdictional techniques for dealing with multinational corporations.
""See note 53 supra. 59 DC(IT) Ann. III, Art. 5, para. 7.
"'See ICNT/Rev.1 Ann. II, Art. 5, para. 1(b). Since the technology is by definition not
generally available on the open market, compensation for the value inherent in its restricted
availability would certainly seem relevant in determining fair and reasonable commercial
terms and conditions. A miner does not lose or give away his exclusive use of technology;
he sells it for fair value.
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corporate relationship between the operator and the owner of the tech-
nology."
61
The failure to eliminate completely the obligation to transfer technology
to a developing country under the so-called Brazil clause 62 may be the most
controversial aspect of the resultant text. Those who opposed its elimination
argued that it applies only with respect to a reserved site proposed by the
miner himself, and then only if it "would not involve transfer of technology
to a third State or the nationals of a third State," and that it is further
restricted by the overall 10-year time limit on the technology transfer obliga-
tions of miners. They did agree, however, to the additional qualification that
a miner's obligation to transfer technology to a developing country "shall
only apply .. .where technology has not been requested or transferred by
him to the Enterprise.
63
9. Annex 11,64 Article 7 on selection of applicants: the priority accorded the
Enterprise by paragraph 4
Under the ICNT, whenever a selection had to be made between an appli-
cation for a plan of work by a state or private party and one by the Enter-
prise for a reserved area, priority was given to the Enterprise. 65
Under the new text, the question of selection no longer affects approval
of plans of work (contracts).6 6 The question would arise only if, at the end of
any given 4-month period, approval of all the applications for a production
authorization received during that period result in production in excess of
the interim production limitation or a production limitation arising under
a commodity agreement to which the Authority is party. In that case, in an
effort to preserve the balance of the parallel system, the Enterprise would
have priority to receive a production authorization with respect to a reserved
area "whenever fewer reserved sites than non-reserved sites are under ex-
ploitation. ' 67 The private applicant who fails to receive a production au-
thorization at the time would have priority in subsequent periods until one
is awarded to him.
68
10. Annex 11,69 Article 10 on joint arrangements: the failure to make clear that
they have the same security of tenure as other contracts
The new text provides that joint arrangements between a contractor and
the Enterprise "shall have the same protection against termination, suspen-
sion or revision as contracts with the Authority. 70
61 DC(1T) Ann. III, Art. 5, para. 3(c). 62Id., para. 3(e).
6 Ibid. " See note 53 supra.6 ICNT/Rev.1 Ann. II, Art. 7, para. 4. ' See note 48 supra.
6 DC(IT) Ann. III, Art. 7, para. 6. " DC(IT) Ann. III, Art. 7, para. 4.
6 9See note 53 supra.
" DC(IT) Ann. III, Art. 11. A contract may be revised "only with the consent of the parties."
Suspension or termination of a contract is permitted only in case of "serious, persistent and
wilful violations" after the contractor is afforded "a reasonable opportunity to exhaust the
judicial remedies available to him," or in cases of failure to comply with a final binding dispute
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S1. Annex III, 7 A rticles 10 or 11 on payments by the Enterprise: the failure to
state that the Enterprise is liable for the same payments as the contractors, at
least with respect to activities in nonreserved sites
The basic problem here was to ensure that the Enterprise did not enjoy a
substantial economic advantage, unbalancing the parallel system by virtue of
exemption from the obligation to make payments on production and profits
to the Authority in the same amount as other miners. On the other hand,
there was a perceived need to build up the reserves of the Enterprise.
The solution 72 found was to retain all of the net income of the Enterprise
in its reserves during an initial period required for it to become self-support-
ing. During that period, which is not to exceed 10 years from the commence-
ment of commercial production by the Enterprise, it will also be exempt
from making payments on production and profits to the Authority. After
that initial period, however, the Enterprise (an independent commercial
enterprise under Annex IV) will become liable for the same payments
as contractors, and the Assembly will determine what portion of the
remaining net income of the Enterprise (after such payments) is to be
transferred to the Authority and what portion is to be retained in the
Enterprise's reserves.
12. Annex IH,73 Article 10 on financing the Enterprise: the failure to require that
payments and guaranties be in convertible currencies
The text now requires that funds made available to the Enterprise be in
"freely usable currencies or currencies which are freely available and ef-
fectively usable in the major foreign exchange markets." The freely usable
currencies will be defined in the rules, regulations, and procedures of the
Authority in accordance with prevailing international monetary practices. 74
settlment decision applicable to the contractor. DC(IT) Art. 153, para. 6; Ann. III, Arts. 18
and 19. Annex III, Article 18 was revised to make clear that monetary penalties are an alterna-
five to suspension or termination of a contract in all cases of contract violation.
" Annex III of the ICNT/Rev. 1 became Annex IV of the ICNT/Rev.2 and the DC(IT)
as amended.
'DOIT) Ann. IV, Art. 10, para. 3. 7 See note 71 supra.
71 DC(IT) Ann. IV, Art. 11, para. 3(g). This provision is modeled after similar provisions
included in recent international commodity agreements and the Common Fund in response to
the rc% ision of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. See Art. 1, para.
9 of the Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, UN Doc. TD/IPCY
CFI/CON F/24 (1980); Art. XXX(f) of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, as amended by Resolution 31-4 of the Board of Governors, effective April 1, 1978, UN
D',c. IMF(091 )A7.
A number of other improvements were made in the text on financing the Enter-
prise, While the basic provision that the Enterprise will initially be afforded the funds neces-
sary t., explore and exploit one mine site through interest-free loans and loan guarantees from
states parties is retained, the text now specifies that the draft rules, regulations, and pro-
cedures prepared by the Preparatory Commission shall include the precise overall amount and
an) criteria and factors for its adjustment. Id., para. 3(a). Thus, states will have a better idea of
their precise obligations without its being necessary to deal with the question (including the
problem of inflation) in the Convention. In addition, the financial obligations of any one state
cannot exceed its percentage under the UN scale of assessments at the time, which has a maxi-
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13. Annex III, Article 12: tax immunity for the Enterprise
The ICNT/Rev. 1 flatly stated that the "Enterprise, its assets, property, and
revenues . . . shall be immune from taxation.
7 5
The new text, in addition to permitting the Enterprise to waive its
privileges,7 6 changes the taxation provision to read: "The Enterprise shall
negotiate with the host countries in which its offices and facilities are lo-
cated for exemption from direct and indirect taxation. '77 The result is that
states that desire to have Enterprise offices and facilities in their territory
are free to offer tax incentives for this purpose, which, of course, they are
free to do even in the absence of such a provision. Like any other business,
the Enterprise would wish to seek and consider available tax relief in de-
ciding where to locate its offices and facilities.
7 8
In this connection, both a potential host state and, from an entirely dif-
ferent perspective, a potential business partner of the Enterprise will wish to
reflect that while in principle the Enterprise is to be treated in the same
way that a state treats "entities conducting business" within its territory,7 9
the Enterprise's property and assets are "immune from confiscation, ex-
propriation, requisition, and any other form of seizure by executive or
legislative action. '80 The private parties to joint venture contracts with the
Enterprise may seek to avail themselves of these benefits in deciding on the
allocation of title over vulnerable assets. Should this feature of the Conven-
tion have demonstrably positive effects on stimulating investment in de-
veloping countries where there is otherwise a significant risk of expropria-
tioft, it could in time promote a more favorable attitude toward restraints
on expropriation of other kinds of foreign investment in developing
countries.
The Antimonopoly Clause
The French delegation continued to seek substantial increa:es in the so-
called antimonopoly restrictions, with some support from the USSR, and op-
position from the United States, West Germany, and the United Kingdom.
mum of 25% (the U.S. share). Voluntary measures to deal with any shortfall caused by the
failure of all UN members to ratify can be adopted only by consensus in the Assembly. Id.,
para. 3(b) and (c). While states need to supply promissory notes for the full amount of their
share of the total interest-free loans at the outset, the Enterprise will call up the funds under
the notes gradually in accordance with a schedule reflecting its requirements Id., para, 3(d).
Provision is made for preparing a schedule for repayment of the interest-free loans, Id.,
para. 3(f).
75 ICNT/Rev.1 Ann. III, Art. 12, para. 5. - DC(IT) Ann. IV, Art. 13, para. 7.
7Id., para. 5.
78 Questions also arise regarding the immunities of the Authority from taxation. These
were resolved (DC(IT) Art. 183) by using the language of the Common Fund Agreement as a
model. See Art. 48, paras. 1-3 of the Agreement Establishing the Common Fund, supra
note 74.
7 DC(IT) Ann. IV, Art. 13, para. 4(d). 801d., para. 4(a).
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The previous criteria8 l were slightly reformulated and two minor additions
were made.
8 2
III. THE SECOND COMMITTEE
The main outstanding issues in the Second Committee identified by the
author at the end of the eighth session were those concerning the conti-
nental shelf where it extends seaward 200 miles from the coast, and de-
limitation of the economic zone and continental shelf between states with
opposite or adjacent coasts.
8 3
The Continental Shelf
(1) Ridges. The Soviet delegation, supported by others, continued to press
for clarification of the complex provisions regarding the outer limit of the
continental shelf in areas of ridges. The concern centered on the desirability
of making clear that the rule that the continental shelf may not extend
further than 350 miles from the coast or 100 miles from the 2,500-meter
isobath, whichever is further seaward, is intended as a limitation, not as a
basis for extending the shelf beyond the outer edge of the continental
margin as defined in the Convention by the Irish formula.8 4
From the perspective of some broad margin states, it was equally desirable
to make clear that irregular features, howsoever named, that are natural
components of the continental margin and satisfy the Irish formula can be
used in applying the alternative 2,500-meter-plus-100-mile test.
Negotiations on this matter were successfully completed at the first part of
the ninth session. The principle that the continental margin does not in-
clude "the deep ocean floor" was clarified by adding to that phrase the words
"with its oceanic ridges," which make clear that the outer limit of the conti-
nental shelf is at the 200-mile limit in such cases.8 5 Either the 350-mile or
the 2,500-meter-plus-100-mile test can be applied by a coastal state,
,' ICNT/Re,.I, Ann. II, Art. 6, paras. 3(d) and 4.
"2 The scope of the clause was clarified to apply only to plans of work actually held by a state,
not those that were approved but are no longer held by it, and only to nonreserved sites. DC(IT)
Ann. I II, Art. 6, para. 3(c). The "antidensity" clause was reformulated as 30% of a circular area
of 400,000 square kilometers surrounding the center of the proposed site. Ibid. The percentage
of the total unreserved area of the seabed that can be held was reduced from 3% to 2%. Ibid. A
reference was added to avoiding "discrimination against any State or system" in cases of
selection among applications for production authorizations. Id., Art. 7, para. 5. A new clause
permits the Authority to adopt rules, regulations, and procedures to deal with cases where
selection among competing applicants is necessary after the end of the period during which the
interim production limitation is in effect (presumably because of limits in a commodity
agreement to which the Authority is party). Id., Art. 6, para. 5. A consensus in the Council is of
course required for adoption of such rules, regulations, and procedures. DC(IT) Arts. 161,
para. 7(d), and 162, para. 2(n)(ii).
"3See 74 AJIL at 7.
4 See discussion in id. at 19-22; DC(IT) Art. 76.
'5 DC(IT) Art. 76, para. 3.
1981]
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
assuming the Irish formula is satisfied, to "submarine elevations that are
natural components of the continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises,
caps, banks and spurs"; but in other cases, "on submarine ridges, the outer
limit of the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from"
the coast 86 even though the Irish formula might otherwise place the limit of
the continental margin further seaward (see figure 1). These texts emerged
after intensive discussions between broad margin states and the Soviet
Union on new language and the effects of that language.
87
(2) Sri Lanka's proposal for a special approach to determining the extent of its
continental margin. A consensus statement of understanding will be ap-
pended to the Final Act of the conference. It sets forth a special method
based on average thickness of sediment for determining the outer limit of
the continental margin in the Bay of Bengal because of the peculiar effect
of Article 76 on the characteristics of the continental margin in question,
where there is a very broad continental rise beyond a very narrow shelf
and slope.88 While not strictly a statement of interpretation, 8 ' its intent is
to reproduce a result in that area equivalent to the effect of applying
Article 76 in the rest of the world. It is assumed that the Commission on the
"Ild., para. 6. An interesting question regarding these texts is when, if ever, a submarine
ridge that is not a natural component of the continental margin is nevertheless part of the
continental margin despite the exclusion from the continental margin of the "deep ocean floor
with its oceanic ridges." It is possible that lying beneath the seeming contradiction there may be
some subtle questions regarding the nature of evidence required and the ex,.ent of the risk,
particularly if sedimentary rock that may have broken off from the continental margin is dis-
covered to have collected within ridge formations or is presently "hidden" by a basaltic layer.
Thus, uncertainty as to whether a particular "submarine ridge" is an "oceani:" ridge of "the
deep ocean floor," or whether a particular sedimentary formation is part of the continental
margin, would not have potentially sweeping consequences of extendingjurisdiction the length
of the ridge under the 2500-meter-plus-100-mile test, but might result "at worst" in extending
jurisdiction from 200 miles to 350 miles, a lesser but nevertheless serious result.
87As a neighbor of the Soviet Union (the main proponent of an amendment on ridges),
the United States ensured that there was in fact common understanding between the dele-
gations regarding the effect of this language in relevant areas before supporting it.
The proposed paragraph 5 bis (now Article 76, paragraph 6) reads as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5, on submarine ridges, the outer limit of
the continental shelf shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured. This paragraph does not apply to submarine
elevations that are natural components of the continental margin, such as its plateaux,
rises, caps, banks and spurs.
The U.S. Representative, Ambassador Richardson, made the following stitement on the
record in Plenary on April 3, 1980:
Our support for the proposal regarding the continental shelf contained in Ambassador
Aguilar's report rests on the understanding that it is recognized-and to the best of our
knowledge there is no contrary interpretation-that features such -s the Chukchi
plateau situated to the north of Alaska and its component elevations cannot be considered
a ridge and are covered by the last sentence of the proposed paragraph 5 his.
Interested delegations were notified in advance that the statement would be made. There was
no dissent as to its substance.
1 See Conf. Doc. C.2/Informal Meeting/65 (1980).
s9 The technique of a consensus statement of understanding was used because some dele-
gations were reluctant to reopen discussion of the text of the Convention on j:he limits of the
continental shelf.
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FIGURE 1
DIAGRAM OF ARTICLE 76
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Limits of the Continental Shelf will apply the consensus statement along
with Article 76.
(3) The composition, functions, and procedures of the proposed Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf, including the arrangements in the event the coastal
state has difficulty accepting the Commission's initial reactions to coastal state charts.
As a result of negotiations during the first part of the ninth session, there
is a new annex on the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf9 0
and a corrected text dealing with the effect of the Commission's recom-
mendations.9'
The Commission is elected by the parties to the Convention. It consists
of 21 "experts in the field of geology, geophysics or hydrography . . . who
shall serve in their personal capacities."
'92
A coastal state desiring to establish the limits of its continental shelf
seaward of 200 miles "shall submit particulars of such boundary to the Com-
mission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as pos-
sible but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Con-
vention for that State.193 The Commission's recommendations on the sub-
mission are prepared by a seven-member subcommission and approved by a
two-thirds majority of Commission members present and voting. 4
At this point, the coastal state may agree or disagree with the recom-
mendations. If it agrees, the coastal state is given an extraordinary power
nowhere reproduced with respect to any other maritime limit: the conti-
nental shelf limits "established by a coastal State on the basis of these recom-
mendations shall be final and binding. '9 5 They may not be contested. The
coastal state then deposits with the UN Secretary-General the relevant
charts and data "permanently" describing the outer limits of its continental
shelf both at and beyond 200 miles.
96
These texts give effect to an important recommendation of the Marine
Science Commission established by the U.S. Congress at the very start of the
current efforts: namely, that given the need for certainty by miners on
both sides of the line in order to promote development of resources, pro-
vision should be made for the establishment of a line that will not be
changed.
97
"In the case of disagreement by the coastal State with the recommenda-
tions of the Commission, the coastal State shall, within a reasonable time,
make a revised or new submission to the Commission."9 8 While the coastal
state that disagrees with the Commission is denied the extraordinary power
to insist that all other parties to the Convention are bound to accept its
views regarding the proper application of Article 76, it is not denied the
right to reject the Commission's approach. The Commission is not a court,
90 DC(IT) Ann. II. 91 DC(IT) Art. 76, para. 8.
92 DC(IT) Ann. II, Art. 2. 93 Id., Art. 4.
I"Id.. Arts. 5 and 6. 95 DC(IT) Art. 76, para. 8.
96Id., para. 9.
97 COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION AND
THE SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL ACTION, and 3 PANEL REPORTS (1969).98 DC(IT) Ann. II, Art. 8.
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and legal expertise is not included among the express qualifications of its
members."
It is assumed that, in practice, both the coastal state and the subcommis-
sion will do their best to ensure that the Commission will not approve even
initial recommendations that are likely to be rejected by the coastal state.100
This was considered one of the advantages of using noncontentious ex parte
review by an international commission of experts independent of the Sea-
Bed Authority.
(4) The exemption of developing coastal state importers from the obligation to
contribute revenues derived from mineral exploitation of the continental shelf beyond
200 miles. While there was growing support among developing country
delegations for making a change in the exemption, so much time was de-
voted to other, more critical aspects of the continental shelf problem that-
short of the extreme and unreasonable step ofjeopardizing the whole settle-
ment on the continental margin because of the exemption issue-there
was no opportunity to achieve the necessary measure of support for a
change.10 '
Delimitation of the Economic Zone and Continental Shelf Between States with
Opposite or Adjacent Coasts
(1) The substantive principles governing delimitation, including related matters
such as the right of a state tofile a definitive declaration of interpretation of these
principles. At the end of the first part of the ninth session, the Chairman of
Negotiating Group 7 submitted a proposed new text on delimitation to the
Plenary, which was greeted with cries of anguish from the most vocal
advocates of the two opposing points of view. The text changed the words of
the ICNT. What else it changed is a matter upon which even the most
courageous may hesitate to speculate. The respective texts of paragraph 1 of
Article 74 are shown in table 1.
Some supporters of greater emphasis on equitable principles sent a
strongly worded letter to the President of the conference objecting to the
incorporation of the revised text into the ICNT/Rev.2 since the plenary
debate did not, in their view, indicate that this text had "widespread and
substantial support."'0 2 The difficulty of applying the latter standard is
that no proposal on this subject is likely (at least before "one minute to mid-
night") to enjoy such support in a debate on the record when many delega-
tions are preoccupied with domestic reactions, political signals to their
ld., Art. 2.
'" If requested, the Commission may aid the coastal state in preparing its data for submis-
sion. Id., Art. 3(b). In an, event, a representative of the coastal state making the submission
may participate in relevant proceedings without the right to vote. Id., Art. 5.
" See 74 AJIL at 23 for a discussion of the problem and the alternative proposal by the
U.S. delegation. See also note 18 supra.
"'I The President's explanatory memorandum to the ICNT/Rev.2, paragraph 10 states that
the Chairman of the Second Committee expressed reservations regarding the incorporation
of the new provisions into the ICNT/Rev.2.
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TABLE 1
TEXTS OF ARTICLE 74(l)
ICNT/Rev.1 ICNT/Rev.2 and DC(IT)
The delimitation of the exclusive economic The delimitation of the exclusive economic
zone* between adjacent or opposite States zone* between States with opposite or
shall be effected by agreement in accordance adjacent coasts shall be efficted by agree-
with equitable principles, employing, where ment in conformity with international law.
appropriate, the median or equidistance Such an agreement shall bc in accordance
line, and taking account of all the relevant with equitable principles, employing the
circumstances. median or equidistance line, where
appropriate, and taking account of all
circumstances prevailing in the area
concerned.
* Article 83, paragraph I uses the same text in connection with the continental shelf.
neighbors, and genuine concern that their open support would induce op-
position from someone else.
10 3
At the resumed session, the two groups concerned negotiated directly-in
an intensive series of meetings. While there was insufficient time to complete
the work, it does seem possible that agreement might be reached on a few
wording changes. The discussion also revealed that the proFosal already
worked out at the eighth session on interim measures0 4 enjoyed general
support.
In some respects, the most interesting developments occurred in the dis-
cussions regarding reservations in the Informal Plenary on Final Clauses.
It was possible to achieve agreement on an article prohibiting reservations
"unless expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention" only by
attaching a footnote that states in pertinent part that "the article can be
regarded only as provisional pending the conclusion of discussions on out-
standing substantive issues such as that relating to the delimitation of mari-
time zones as between adjacent and opposite States and to settlement of dis-
putes thereon, where the final solution might include provision for reserva-
tions."05
Moreover, the discussions on reservations revealed another aspect of the
problem: the relationship between Articles 74 and 83 on delimitation and
Article 121 on the regime of islands. Some are worried by the implications
for delimitation of the rule that islands are treated in the same way as other
land territory. 10 6 Others are worried by the exception to this rule, "Rocks
which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall
have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. '10 7 In fact, both sides
may be seeking assurance that a reservation to Articles 74 and 83 constitutes
103 The criteria for incorporation of a revised text set forth in Doc. AICONF.62/62 are dis-
cussed by the author in 73 AJIL at 4-5 and 74 AJIL at 2.
' ICNT/Rev.2 and DC(IT) Art. 74, para. 3, and Art. 83, para. 3. See 74 AJIL at 5.
103 DC(IT) Art. 309 and n.1. 'o DC(Il) Art. 121, para. 2.
107 Id., para. 3.
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a reservation to Article 121, insofar as the latter is relevant to the two
articles on delimitation. Such a reservation would not, of course, affect the
application of Article 121 to determining the seaward limits of coastal
state jurisdiction where delimitation between states with opposite or ad-
jacent coasts is not the issue.
(2) The scope of the compulsory conciliation of delimitation disputes. The proposal
of the Chairman of Negotiating Group 7 regarding settlement of de-
limitation disputes was incorporated into the ICNT/Rev.2 and, tactics aside,
was not the subject of much subsequent concern.
The text'"' permits a state to refuse to accept compulsory third-party
arbitration or adjudication regarding delimitation between states with op-
posite or adjacent coasts. However, it must accept submission to nonbinding
conciliation when the dispute "arises subsequent to the entry into force of"
the Convention and "where no agreement within a reasonable period of
time is reached in negotiations between the parties," with the exception of a
"dispute that necessarily involves the concurrent consideration of any un-
settled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over continental or
insular land territory."0 9
Marine Mammals
The revised text on marine mammals long sought by various environ-
mental groups and strongly supported by the U.S. delegation was finally
approved with minor revisions by the Second Committee at the first part of
the session."0 The text makes clear that it permits either a complete
prohibition or more restrictive limitations or regulations to protect marine
mammals than the Convention would otherwise require and directs
particular attention to the need for appropriate organizational arrange-
ments for the protection of whales and other cetaceans. Thus, once this
Convention enters into force, it will definitively overrule arguments made by
some whalers and sealers that protective measures for marine mammals can
do no more than ensure the maintenance of a maximum sustainable yield,
and that international regulation of whales and other cetaceans can be
approached in the same way as such regulation is pursued in the case of
ordinary commercial fisheries. The Convention would therefore remove
legal roadblocks and open the substantive and procedural doors to the type
of strong and effective protection of marine mammals that is being urged by
environmentalists and conservationists of many nations.
1W' ICNT/Rev.2 and DC(IT) Art. 298, para. l(a).-
I lbid. While the exclusion for land territory disputes is drafted so that it does not literally
apply to adjudication or arbitration under the Convention when a state does not elect to reject
such procedures, it would seem that this is a mere drafting point. In any event, the same
result seems implicit in the fact that the jurisdiction of a judicial or arbitral tribunal under
the Convention is limited to the interpretation or application of the Convention. The Conven-
tion does not deal with questions of sovereignty or other rights over continental or insular land
territory- questions that can hardly be regarded as incidental or ancillary.
I' DC(IT) Art. 65 is the same as the draft text in 74 AJIL at 5 n.23 except that the words,
"In this connexion," have been deleted from the start of the second sentence.
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Other Second Committee Matters
At the first part of the ninth session, the Second Committee completed a
full review of all proposals for changes outside the mandate of the various
negotiating groups. In addition to the amendment on marine mammals, it
approved the technical amendments on suspension of innocent passage
already negotiated at the eighth session"' and a few other technical pro-
posals. Controversial suggestions regarding archaeological and historical
objects'1 2 and the use or threat of force were ultimately dealt with during the
resumed ninth session by the Informal Plenary on General Provisions, and
will be discussed by the author in that context.
During the resumed ninth session, the Second Committee reviewed
various recommendations of the Drafting Committee, but discussed only
those that might have some substantive implications. It supported most of
the Drafting Committee's suggestions.
Extensive discussion between some straits states and maritime coun-
tries resulted in a few nonsubstantive technical clarifications that could com-
mand consensus and substantially reduce the concerns of straits states about
the straits articles. Aside from a new general provision,"1 all were clearly of
a technical character designed to elucidate the interpretation of the existing
text. While there were no objections to their substance, the texts never made
it all the way through some complex procedures and presumably will be
considered again at the next session.
1 4
The Argentine and Canadian delegations tried to increase the rights of
the coastal state regarding fish stocks found both within and in areas im-
mediately seaward of the economic zone.1 1 5 They were oppo,.ed by other
"I DC(IT) Art. 25, para. 3 adds the words "including weapons exercises." See 74 AJIL at
4-5 and n.22.
1 Conf. Doc. C.2/Informal Meeting/43/Rev.I (1979). See 74 AJIL at 23 n.79.
113 Discussed infra at p. 242.
114 The proposed amendments are as follows.
Article 42(I)(b): change "applicable" to "generally accepted" international regulations (as,
for example, in Art. 39(2)(b)). The English Language Group of the Drafting Committee has
already included this in its recommendation on harmonization of these terms in various
articles. Conf. Doc. ELGDC/4 (1980).
Article 42(1)(b): delete the word "oily" in the phrase "oil, oily wastes and other noxious
substances."
Article 221: make clear that the international law right of intervention following upon a
maritime casualty is preserved not only beyond the territorial sea but within the territorial
sea in straits. The main problem here was to find a way to draft around the position of a few
coastal states that the right of intervention is inherent in their sovereignty in the territorial
sea, and thus ought not to be mentioned in connection with a provision dealing with other
areas.
Article 233: make clear that the exclusion of sections 5, 6, and 7 of the pollution text from
application to "the legal regime of straits used for international navigation" refers to passage,
not to activities other than passage, which would conform it to the general principle stated in
Article 34, paragraph 1 and the rule in Article 38, paragraph 3.
"' See DC(IT) Art. 63, para. 2.
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delegations both on the merits and because of a general reluctance to reopen
fisheries questions." 6
The major unsettling factor in the work of the Second Committee is the
effort of some delegations to promote an amendment requiring prior notifi-
cation to and authorization by the coastal state for innocent passage of war-
ships through the territorial sea. Such an amendment cannot command
consensus.
This effort is part of a still broader problem. Since so many of the sensi-
tive issues in the Second Committee were resolved many years ago, it is not
as apparent to some in that committee as it is, for example, in the First
Committee that artificial voting victories by numerical majorities would be
purely pyrrhic-there would be no ratified Convention, and no evidence of
acceptance of the preferred text by those most affected for purposes of
customary law. Even if it were assumed that the substantive impact on major
maritime countries of an adverse vote on a particular issue might not alone
be sufficient to destroy any chance that they would accept the Convention,
it would almost certainly have that effect when coupled with anger at the
vote itself and other reasons for being ill at ease with the Convention.
IV. THE THIRD COIMMITTEE
Despite assumptions that informal substantive negotiations on marine
scientific research had been completed at the eighth session,11 7 there was a
concerted effort by some coastal states to alter the accommodations made.
The result of intensive negotiation and debate during the first part of the
ninth session was agreement on some changes in the precise phraseology
proposed by the Chairman of the Third Committee in his report11 8 at the
end of the eighth session. The substance of those recommendations, how-
ever, was preserved.
The greatest difficulty involved the precise words to describe those areas
of the continental shelf beyond 200 miles designated by the coastal state in
which it has the right to exercise its discretion to withhold consent for
marine scientific research. Under the Chairman's proposal, the coastal state
could designate "areas in which exploitation or exploratory operations, such
as exploratory drilling are occurring or are about to occur."" 9 The new
text expresses the same thought in a different way by referring to designa-
tion of areas "in which exploitation or detailed exploratory operations fo-
cused on those areas are occurring or will occur within a reasonable period
of time."""0
The decision by the coastal state to exercise its discretion to designate
I" A compromise effort to redraft Article 63, paragraph 2 to bring it into closer conformity
with Article 117 (which applies to all conservation problems beyond the economic zone) en-
countered belated opposition, but may be considered again.
11 See 74 AJIL at 24-29.
n1 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/91, at 75 (1979), setting forth UN Doc. AICONF.62/L.41 (1979).
"I d., Art. 24b bis. 120 DC(IT) Art. 246, para. 6.
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such areas and to withhold consent for one of the enumerated reasons is
not itself subject to third-party settlement. 1 2 However, the questions
whether it has discretion and whether that discretion is being exercised in
a manner compatible with the Convention are not thereby excluded. Specific
provision is made for compulsory conciliation in this connection.1
22
Not until the ninth session was it possible to distinguish rationally between
"suspension" and "cessation" of research activities. It has now been made
clear that the coastal state may require cessation immediately in case of a
"major change" in the project or activities as compared with the description
on which the coastal state based its consent. In other cases, it may request
compliance or, if need be, order suspension; if the violations "are not
rectified within a reasonable period of time," it may then require cessation of
the project.123 The order of suspension must be lifted as soon as the research-
ing state has rectified the delinquencies that caused suspension to be
invoked. The decision to order suspension or cessation is subject to compul-
sory conciliation regarding compatibility with the Convention.
24
One unfortunate change in the text is the restriction on presumed con-
sent for international organizations of which the coastal state is a member to
carry out projects earlier approved by that state in detail within the organiza-
tion. 25 This presumption could have helped to encourage tangible aid
and support for regional scientific research organizations of developing
countries from countries with substantial oceanographic capabilities. The
presumption was qualified by a French amendment that allows the coastal
state to object within 4 months of notification of the project by the organi-
zation. 26 The change seems to reflect concern by foreign ministries that
governments may not have, or ought not to be encouraged to seek, tight
political control over their delegations' participation in the project decisions
of intergovernmental scientific organizations. The result is only somewhat
better than the result that would obtain under the general provision for im-
plied consent when the coastal state does not respond within 4 months.
2 7
Nevertheless, the rule of implied consent is itself a significant benefit of the
Convention.
Informal negotiations on marine scientific research, and with them the in-
formal negotiations of the Third Committee, were completed at the end of
121 DC(IT) Art. 297, para. 2(a).
122 d., para. 2(b). Furthermore, the text makes clear that the phrase "in normal circum-
stances" refers to the state of relations between the researching state and the coastal state by
adding language stating that the absence of diplomatic relations between them does not neces-
sarily mean that circumstances are not normal. A crucial change was made in paragraph 2 of
Article 249, which now states that (1) only with respect to those research activities specified
in paragraph 5 of Article 246 may the coastal states impose obligations additional to those
contained in its paragraph 1; and (2) limitations on international release of research findings
apply only to results of direct significance for exploration and exploitation and these limitations
must be reasonable. Finally, the broadly stated obligation in Article 249 to assist coastal states in
assessing research results has been appropriately clarified by allowing a choice of methods.
This would be a one-time obligation for each research project, not a continuing one.
12 DC(IT) Art. 253. 124 DC(IT) Art. 297, para. 2.
22 See ICNT/Rev.1 Art. 247. 2' See DC(IT) Art. 247.
1271d., Art. 252.
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the first part of the ninth session. During the second part of the session, the
Third Committee met several times to consider a list of drafting changes
proposed by the Chairman, some of which drew upon the recommendations
of the Drafting Committee. The procedure followed, by which a change
would not be made if a delegation maintained its objections, enabled the
Third Committee to function in a reasonably relaxed fashion without fear-
ing that it was opening the door to substantive negotiations that could alter
the balance of the text. However, Article 208, paragraph 3 is still incorrectly
drafted.
The procedural approach to determining whether a particular change
alters the substantive balance of the text may be preferable to attempts to
draw the line between substance and drafting in principle. The underlying
idea is that if a delegation persists in maintaining that a particular change
would adversely alter the substantive balance, after reasonable efforts to
persuade it otherwise, then that change ought not to be treated as a tech-
nical or drafting matter.
V. THE GENERAL PROVISIONS
Part XVI of the text contains five new "general provisions" prepared in
the Informal Plenary. The first three were presented as a compromise
package negotiated by various supporters and opponents of the original
proposals.
Good Faith and Abuse of Rights
The first article 28 obligates the parties to "exercise the rights, jurisdic-
tions and freedoms recognized in this Convention in a manner which would
not constitute an abuse of rights." The article reflects an idea originally
presented by Mexico and, as redrafted, cosponsored by the U.S. dele-
gation.'1
2
Peaceful Uses of the Seas
Another new article,':" inspired by Article 2, paragraph 4 of the UN
Charter, requires states parties, in exercising their rights under the Conven-
'2' DC(IT) Art. 300.
IZ Conf. Doc. GPt2 and Rev. 1(1980).
An innocuous reference to "all relevant circumstances," which surely have to be considered
in determining the existence of abuse, nevertheless had to be removed because of objections
from delegations that prefer to emphasize equidistance rather than relevant circumstances in
the Convention's articles on delimitation of the economic zone or continental shelf between
states with opposite or adjacent coasts. There was an air of arrihre pensie in this skirmish,
perhaps related to the possibility that in the end the Convention may contain no articles at
all on delimitation between neighboring states, or that reservations will be permitted to those
articles.
Article 300 contains a slight drafting problem that arose in repeated translation between
Spanish and English. It requires good faith discharge of obligations entered into "in con-
formitv with this Convention." That language is intended to refer to obligations under the
Convention itself.
130 DC(IT) Art. 301.
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tion, to "refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial in-
tegrity or political independence of any State, or 131 in any other manner in-
consistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations."
A similar obligation already applied under the ICNT to the flag state or
state of registry of ships and aircraft exercising the right of transit passage
through straits or the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage. 3 Moreover,
such a threat or use of force is expressly incompatible with innocent
passage.1 33 In addition, the ICNT contained express requirements regard-
ing uses for "peaceful purposes" applicable to the economic zone and the
high seas, 134 as well as to the deep seabeds.
1 35
The proponents of the clause on force wanted it added to the articles on
the exclusive economic zone, using language identical to that of the Charter.
This was rejected by the maritime states. They noted the problems of selec-
tive quotation from the Charter out of context, and the inappropriateness of
including an article on security questions in the regime of the eco-
nomic zone.
Each side was able to argue that the other was being unreasonable since
the obligation contained in the UN Charter is binding on all in any event.
There was very broad support during the debate for including a general
clause on the subject. To accommodate the objections, the resulting pro-
vision, like the ICNT texts from which it was drawn, repeats the Charter
requirements without creating new rights or obligations: it cross-references
all of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter and ap-




Another new provision, originally proposed by the United States131 and
inspired by the Treaty of Rome,1 38 makes clear that a state party is not
required "to supply information the disclosure of which is contrary to the
131 The President was not successful in his attempt to persuade the conference to insert the
word "act" here in order to correct what he felt was an error in the wording of the Charter
itself.
132 ICNT/Rev.1 and DC(IT) Arts. 39, para. l(b) and 54.
13 ICNT/Rev.1 and DC(IT) Art. 19, para. 2(a).
134 ICNT/Rev.1 and DC(IT) Arts. 58, para. 2 and 88.
2 3 ICNT/Rev.I and DC(IT) Art. 141.
36 In light of the general application of the new clause to the overall behavior of states at sea,
it was considered more appropriate to use the Charter word "inconsistent" (with the princi-
ples of international law embodied in the Charter) than the term "in violation" (of those
principles) which is used in the specific operational context of particular ships in innocent pas-
sage or particular ships or aircraft in transit passage or archipelagic sea lanes passage. Com-
pare DC(IT) Arts. 19, para. 2(a) and 39, para. 1(b) with Art. 301.
137 Conf. Doc. GP/3 (1980).
138 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, inforce Jan. 1, 11958, 298 UNTS
11, Art. 223, para. 1(a).
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essential interests of its security."' 39 There was very broad support from all
regions and groups for the principle involved, and no dissent. The difficul-
ties lay in finding a text that did not create an unintended potential for bad
faith and abuse, particularly with respect to transfer of technology obliga-
tions, and in overcoming objections to copying a text from another treaty
with limited participation and authoritative interpretive mechanisms of
its own.
There are three elements to the solution. First, a state enjoys the right to
withhold security information "in the fulfilment of its obligations under the
relevant provisions of the Convention." This clause emphasizes the limited
purposes of the exclusion: on the one hand, the obligations cannot be ap-
plied to require or coerce the disclosure of essential security information;
on the other hand, the right to withhold such information does not in other
respects alter the duty to fulfill obligations under the Convention.
Second, the exclusion is "[w]ithout prejudice to the right of any State
Party to resort to the procedures for the settlement of disputes" provided
in the Convention. This clause was understood to incorporate the widely
followed national practice pursuant to which, if a government chooses not
to contest a particular case or issue rather than reveal the information neces-
sary to do so, it cannot require that the case be dismissed or the issue de-
cided in its favor merely because it has a right to withhold information
necessary to proper adjudication. t4 °
Third, it is made clear that the exclusion cannot be abused, and that the
state concerned must be acting in good faith. This was achieved by present-
ing the article as part of a package that includes the article prohibiting abuse
of rights, and by excluding the words "it considers" before the words "con-
trary to the essential interests of its security."''
Archaeological Objects Found at Sea
There has long been general agreement on a provision dealing with
"archaeological and historical objects" found on the deep seabeds.142
's DC(IT) Art. 302.
Preservation of the right to "resort to" dispute settlement procedures specifically refers to
a jurisdictional issue such as might arise under one of the optional exceptions to third-party
settlement in DC(IT) Art. 298. These words limit the application of this "no prejudice" clause
to the right to bring the action. The "no prejudice" clause does not apply to the gathering
of evidence in the exercise of that right; one of the reasons for the article is to protect a state
from any requirement to produce security information in evidence.
"I Developing country jurists, of course, were quick to point out that these textual safe-
guards did not and logically could not have the effect of requiring or coercing a state to re-
veal secret information to foreign nationals or others in order to show its good faith, or of
punishing it for failure to do so. They nevertheless felt that the result was an important politi-
cal restraint on abuse, in particular in applying the exclusion to the obligation to transfer
deep seabed mining technology. The President was referring to this good faith requirement in
his report when he said that the exclusion does not detract from the transfer of technology obli-
gations. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.58 (1980).
14 Art. 149 of the DC(IT) and its predecessor texts.
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The lack of controversy was doubtless due, at least in part, to the relatively
slight concern that many such objects would be found in areas seaward
of the 200-mile economic zone and the continental margin.143
The real focus of concern is the area immediately adjacent to the terri-
torial sea, particularly in the Mediterranean Sea. Proposals were made to
give the coastal state a new right over its continental shelf, namely, the con-
trol of archaeological objects.'4 These were found objectionable on sub-
stantive grounds and because they would reopen negotiations on the sub-
stance of the economic zone and continental shelf regimes. Major maritime
powers made clear that they could not accept a general extension to the con-
tinental shelf or economic zone of a set of coastal state rights that bore no
relation to natural resources. They argued that over time it could alter the
conceptual character of the regimes applicable to those areas, a matter of
particular importance in dealing properly with the question of allocating
residual rights. The U.S. delegation proposed a new general provision on
the subject that introduced for the first time the idea of a duty to protect
archaeological objects found at sea.145 This proposal was regarded as helpful
but inadequate because it failed to provide for enforcement with respect
to many small craft beyond effective flag state supervision. On the other
hand, while enforcement protection in the territorial sea alone was insuffi-
cient, 46 the vast seaward reaches of the economic zone and continental
shelf were really not relevant to the problem. The main issue was the polic-
ing of the area immediately beyond the territorial sea.
The 24-mile contiguous zone 47 virtually suggested itself. No one objected
to the result of yielding some enforcement powers over archaeological ob-
jects in the area to the coastal state, provided they were narrowly circum-
scribed and did not constitute a precedent.
Nevertheless, this solution posed ajurisprudential problem.148 To create a
new "archaeological" zone, or expressly to expand the competence of the
coastal state to include regulation of diving for archaeological objects in the
contiguous zone, would amount to converting the contiguous zone from an
area where the coastal state has limited enforcement competence to one
where it has legislative competence.1
49
143 Even so, Article 149 reveals that the "internationalists" obtained a reference to the "bene-
fit of mankind as a whole" but no role for the Sea-Bed Authority, while the various "States
of origin" obtained an exhortation that "particular regard" be paid to their "preferential rights"
but that fell short of confirming any particular right or proprietary interest.
'"See note 112 supra. "" Conf. Doc. GP/4 (1980).
146 Particularly for a state that might not extend its territorial sea to 12 miles.
147 Art. 33 of the DC(IT) and its antecedents.
"4 The rights of the coastal state in the contiguous zone do not apply as such to archaeologi-
cal objects found there. These rights are limited to exercising the control in the zone neces-
sary to prevent and punish infringement within its territory or territorial sea of its customs,
fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations. Ibid.
149 There would then arguably be less doctrinal basis for preventing a gradual expansion of
the legislative competences of the coastal state in the zone with respect to matters not in-
cluded within its economic zone and continental shelf rights, and thus inevitably in the direc-
tion of a territorial sea.
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Faced with such problems, judges and legislators have since time im-
memorial (or, more appropriately in this case, at least since the days of
ancient Rome) taken refuge in the minor premise: presume the facts and
leave the principle intact. Certainly, in many cases the small craft engaged in
recovering archaeological objects immediately beyond the territorial sea of a
coastal state are operating out of a port or anchorage of that state. Accord-
ingly, a basis exists in fact for the creation of a presumption that removal
of an archaeological object from the seabed within the contiguous zone
would result in an infringement within its territory or territorial sea of the
customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary regulations of the coastal state.
Although in some cases this is a legal fiction, it serves some of the time-
honored functions of legal fictions: it avoids the procedural and substantive
risks and complications of a doctrinal change and in a special situation
achieves with efficiency a generally desired result.15 °
The resultant article' 51 establishes a basic duty of states to protect archaeo-
logical objects and objects of historical origin 52 found at sea and to cooperate
for this purpose. It sets forth the presumption regarding their removal from
the seabed of the 24-mile contiguous zone. It contains a disclaimer of any
effect on private law or rights, that is, "the rights of identifiable owners,
the law of salvage or other rules of admiralty, or laws and practices with re-
spect to cultural exchanges."
1 5 3
11" L. FULLER, LEGAL FiCTIONS (1967), contains a classic analysis of the subject of legal fic-
tions that was being read at the time this conceit was formed. Appearing as it does in a public
law convention of organic character, the conceit ought (for better or worse) to be treated as a
true fiction-a rule of law-rather than as a rule of evidence.
' ' DC(IT) Art. 303.
i The term "archaeological objects and objects of historical origin" is not defined. It is a
reformulation of the term "objects of an archaeological and historical nature" that appears in
the deep seabed mining text (Art. 149).
The provision is not intended to apply to modern objects whatever their historical interest.
Retention of the adjective "historical" was insisted upon by Tunisian delegates, who felt that it
was necessary to cover Byzantine relics that might be excluded by some interpretations of the
word "archaeological." Hence, the term historical "origin," lacking at best in elegance, when
used with the term "archaeological objects" in an article that expressly does not affect the law of
salvage, does at least suggest the idea of objects that are many hundreds of years old.
The article contains no express time limit. As time marches on, so does our sense of what is
old. Nevertheless, given the purpose for using the term "historical," it may be that if a rule of
thumb is useful for deciding what is unquestionably covered by this article, the most appro-
priate of the years conventionally chosen to represent the start of the modern era would be
1453: the fall of Constantinople and the final collapse of the remnants of the Byzantine
Empire. Everything older would clearly be regarded as archaeological or historical. A slight
adjustment to 1492 for applying the article to objects indigenous to the Americas, extended
perhaps to the fall of Tenochtitlin (1521) or Cuzco (1533) in those areas, might have the merit
of conforming to historical and cultural classifications in that part of the world.
I" There is no reference to disposal, and accordingly no reference either to the benefit
of mankind or to the rights of various states of origin as in Article 149. Recognizing that a
convention on the law of the sea can deal with only a small part of the broader issue of
protection and disposal of archaeological objects, Article 303 "is without prejudice to other
international agreements and rules of international law regarding the protection of archaeo-
logical objects and objects of historical origin."
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Responsibility and Liability for Damage
A further general clause makes clear that the liability and responsibility
provisions of the Convention "are without prejudice to the application of
existing rules and the development of further rules regarding responsibility
and liability under international law." This clause was designed to allay
the concerns of Spain and Morocco that because Article 42 provides for re-
sponsibility of the flag state only in cases of violation of the straits articles
themselves (and specific regulations referred to in that article), I he Conven-
tion might be construed, albeit improperly, in a manner that excludes lia-
bility or responsibility under international law for damages caused by acts of
a government ship or state aircraft that are not violations of the straits
articles. 15
VI. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Most of the work regarding settlement of disputes at the ninth session
was done in connection with the various substantive negotiations: First Com-
mittee matters by the Group of Legal Experts on Settlement of Disputes,
settlement of delimitation disputes by Negotiating Group 7, and disputes
over marine scientific research by the Third Committee. These have already
been discussed.
In addition to this work, the Informal Plenary on Settlement of Disputes
considered a variety of proposals, most of them technical and organiza-
tional in character. The most important result was a reorganization that
clarifies the structure of part XV by dividing it into three sections.
The first section sets forth the general obligation to settle disputes peace-
fully and deals with the relationship between the dispute settlement pro-
cedures of the Convention and those contained in other agreements.
Section 2 sets forth the compulsory procedures entailing a binding de-
cision under the Law of the Sea Convention. It establishes the obligation to
subrit to binding adjudication or arbitration disputes regarding the inter-
pretation or application of the Convention at the request of any party to
the dispute.1 s
Section 3 sets forth limitations and optional exceptions to the obligation
to adjudicate or arbitrate under section 2. It establishes an alternative obliga-
tion to submit some disputes excepted from adjudication or arbitration to
nonbinding conciliation at the request of any party to the dispute. Annex
V on conciliation procedures was revised to take account of the possibility
that conciliation proceedings in such cases might be instituted at the request
of only one party and without the cooperation of the other in appointing
conciliators.
"M Spain and Morocco are correct that this would be a misinterpretation. The function of
the responsibility provision in the straits articles is to make clear that no enforcement action
may be taken against a ship or aircraft entitled to sovereign immunity, and ).hat the appro-
priate remedy lies in the international responsibility of the flag state. DC(IT) Art. 42, para. 5;
accord Art. 233.1-5 DC(IT) Art. 286.
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Negotiations regarding settlement of disputes can now be regarded as
completed. (A few minor drafting and technical problems remain, which can
easily be resolved in due course. 6) The importance of this unprecedented
achievement in a major global convention cannot be emphasized too
strongly. Any assessment of the benefits and costs of the Convention will
have to give considerable weight to the dispute settlement provisions. They
serve not only the particular interests protected, 157 but also much broader
interests in extending the rule of law and resort to third-party procedures
for resolving differences as an alternative both to conflict and to excessive
centralized regulation.
VII. THE FINAL CLAUSES
Aside from the work on the problems regarding deep seabed mining, the
most intensive and productive work of the ninth session was devoted to the
final clauses. This included an instructive, informal intersessional meeting
of active participants in the Group of Legal Experts on Final Clauses in
late autumn of 1979; intensive work in the group during the first part of
the ninth session, which resulted in the final report of its Chairman;1 5 8 and
detailed review and negotiation in the Informal Plenary on Final Clauses
during a resumed session, which culminated in the final clauses recom-
mended by the President and incorporated into the new text.159
Enhy into Force and the Preparatoiy Commission
The Convention provides that it is subject to ratification 60 One question
posed was how many instruments of ratification need to be deposited before
the Convention can enter into force for those states that have ratified it. The
conflicting objectives at stake included, on the one hand, a desire to see the
Convention enter into force as soon as possible and, on the other, a desire
to ensure broadly representative participation. The compromise reached on
I"Among these is the question of using ad hoc chambers of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber
in caes involing the Authority. The Group of Legal Experts on Settlement of Disputes
concerning First Committee matters was unable to finish this work because of the press of other
First Committee business.
In light of points raised by the Argentine and Canadian delegations regarding fisheries
beyond the exclusive economic zone, there may be a desire to emphasize on the record that the
power of a court under Article 290 to prescribe provisional measures pending final
adjudication in order "to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to
prevent serious harm to the marine environment" includes the power to order provisional
onservation measures to protect the fish stocks. In this connection, it should be noted that the
Chairman of the Third Committee has already reported a consensus that the term "marine
en'ironment- includes marine life. 10 OFF. REc. 97 (1978). It might also be noted that there is
precedent for such action in the Icelandic Fisheries Jurisdiction case, [1974] ICJ REP. 3.
F,7 Ranging from the right to obtain prompt release of a seized oil tanker without awaiting
c\haustlon of local remedies (Art. 292) to the right to ensure compliance with environmental
standards (Art. 297, para. 1(c)).
C onf. Doc. FC!20 (1980). 159 DC(IT) pt. XVII.
DC(IT) Art. 306. In this discussion references to ratification include accession.
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a requirement of 60 ratifications is, by its nature, artificial: it can as easily
frustrate as promote either objective.
16 1
The more difficult problems concerned the relationship between the
entry into force of the Convention and the establishment of the deep seabed
regime and machinery. It has been asserted for many years that the deep
seabed regime is an integral part of any "package deal" for a substantial
number of developing countries. It follows that the regime must be opera-
tional when the Convention enters into. force. Otherwise, its prohibition on
any claim, acquisition, or exercise of mineral rights and on alienation of
minerals except in accordance with the Convention and the rules and regu-
lations adopted thereunder 162 could be construed to effect a total prohibi-
tion on all deep seabed mining. Industrial and consumer nations could
hardly be expected to accept such a result.
The Authority is required to take up for consideration proposed plans of
work (mining contracts) and applications for production authorization 6
months after the entry into force of the Convention. 16 In order for those
proposed plans of work to be prepared properly and evaluated, all of the
rules, regulations, and procedures regarding deep seabed mininag must be in
place, at least provisionally. In addition, the organs of the Authority must be
established and able to execute their functions with respect to deep sea-
bed mining.
It was generally agreed that a Preparatory Commission should be estab-
lished to draft rules, regulations, and procedures and to make other
preparations to enable the Authority to function when the Convention
enters into force. Considerable progress was made during the first part of
the session on a conference resolution to establish such a Commission.'
Of the remaining issues to be dealt with in the resolution, perhaps the most
interesting is whether states that do not signify a positive interest in becom-
ing party to the Convention by signing it will be permitted to attend meet-
ings, not merely perhaps as observers, but as full members of the
Commission.
The legal arrangements attendant upon entry into force of the Conven-
tion are dealt with in the Convention, not in the resolution. The final clauses
specify that the "rules, regulations and procedures drafted by the Prepara-
tory Commission shall apply provisionally" from the date of entry into force
of the Convention, "pending their formal adoption by the Authority in ac-
cordance with Part XI. '1 65 Absent a guarantee that known rules, regulations,
and procedures will enter into force along with the Convention, it is not
161 While the conference will inevitably hope to avoid reopening "settled" issues, it is possible
that a coalition of developing and developed countries that are interested in avoiding delay in
the entry into force of the Convention may agree to reduce the number in the context of
agreement on other matters designed to facilitate its entry into force.
162 DC(IT) Art. 137.
" DC(IT) Ann. III, Art. 6, para. 1 and Art. 7, para. 1.
16 UN Doc. A/CONF.62/L.55 and Corr.1 (1980); Conf. Docs. PC/l, PC/2, and Corr.1 (1980).
165 DC(IT) Art. 308, para. 4. The significance of this provision is immediately apparent when
one considers that the new text of Article 161 requires consensus in the Council of the Authority
for the adoption of rules, regulations, and procedures.
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clear how the major industrial states (and perhaps others with significant
economic interests at stake) could be persuaded to ratify the Convention.
The First Committee's "package" would be stripped of its content.
The clause regarding provisional application of the rules, regulations, and
procedures drafted by the Preparatory Commission nevertheless contains
a footnote that reflects some disquiet on this matter. One source of the dis-
quiet is legal, namely, a certain reluctance to give legal effect, albeit provi-
sionally, to rules drafted by the Commission without subsequent action by
the Authority.
However, each state will review the entire package. Governments may ac-
cordingly insist upon scrutinizing the draft rules, regulations, and pro-
cedures together with the provisions of the Convention in making the de-
cision whether to ratify the Convention. The legal basis for applying the
rules provisionally is found not in the 'procedures and composition of the
Preparatory Commission, but in the text of the Convention itself and the
legal right of each state to accept or reject the entire package, including the
provisional rules, regulations, and procedures.
Another source of disquiet is the proverb that in diplomacy, nothing is
more permanent than the provisional. Since the provisional rules may ac-
tually be more carefully and intensively scrutinized by states than the per-
manent ones, one is tempted to ask what difference it makes. While it seems
clear that the Authority has the power, if it wishes, to amend or supplement
the provisional rules in the same way as it would amend or supplement the
permanent rules, there may be merit in emphasizing this point in order to
alleviate concerns about the period between entry into force of the Conven-
tion and adoption of a complete set of permanent rules by the Authority.
Ensuring that the Authority can function when the Treaty enters into
force requires that the necessary organs be constituted. The text thus pro-
vides that the Assembly of the Authority shall meet on the date of entry into
force of the Convention and shall elect the Council of the Authority.16
Article 161, however, requires that states that belong to certain specified
interest groups and regional groups be members of the Council. What if
the requisite number for entry into force has ratified the Convention, but
it is not possible to fulfill one or more of the functional or regional group
requirements regarding composition of the Council?
The conceptual solutions to the problem are either to make the criteria
for Council composition criteria as well for entry into force of the Con-
vention, or to provide for some deviation in Council composition so long as
too few ratifications prevent the Council from being constituted as required
by Article 161.
The first option was rejected for a variety of reasons.1 67 The problem with
the second option was that the decision-making procedures under consid-
eration in the First Committee proceeded on the assumption that each of
T DC(IT) Art. 308, para. 3.
'b Substantively, it would have given the Soviet Union, but no other country, effective power
to control entry into force of the Convention. Procedurally, it would have complicated the
already deadlocked negotiations in the First Committee regarding Council voting.
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the relevant groups-particularly the substantive interest groups-would
be fully represented on the Council by the specified number of states. Any
alteration in the composition of the Council could accordingly unbalance
the voting formulas protecting the various interests. However, the serious-
ness of this problem has been significantly attenuated by the fact that under
the new text, consensus is required for major decisions of the Council.
The Chairman of the Group of Legal Experts preferred the second op-
tion and recommended the following text: "The first Council shall be consti-
tuted in a manner consistent with the purposes of article 161 if the provisions
of that article cannot be strictly applied."'""
The President decided to adopt that text. 69 In addition, in an effort to
reduce the likelihood of a problem, the new text also provides for a delay
of 12 months after the date of deposit of the 60th instrument of ratifica-
tion before the Convention enters into force.170 Thus, states will have an ad-
168 Conf. Doc. FCI20 (1980). The precise language suggested by the Chairman of the Group
of Legal Experts was not the subject of negotiation, since most debate concentrated on the
underlying option.
It seems reasonably clear that the provision applies only in case it is impossi le, from among
the parties to the Convention, to satisfy all of the requirements regarding Council composition
in a manner consistent with Article 161. It also seems reasonably clear that a deviation from
strict compliance with Article 161 is only permissible to the extent it is necessary to deal
with the effect of the absence from among parties to the Convention of one or more states
necessary to satisfy a particular requirement.
While the term "first Council" is unclear, it also seems reasonably clear that the deviation
from strict application of Article 161 can persist only as long as the absence that necessi-
tated it persists. If a state ratifies the Convention after entry into force, and if its election to
the Council would result in elimination of at least one reason for deviation from strict applica-
tion of Article 161, then it should be elected to the Council as soon as pra.:ticable, and the
arrangements made to deal with its absence eliminated.
What is not clear is the precise meaning of the phrase "in a manner consistent with the
purpose of article 161." The main reason for this is that it is difficult to determine in ad-
vance the precise nature of the problem, given the large number of alternative possibilities.
Since any deviation from the strict requirements of Article 161 could have a major effect on
the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Authority during the delicate initial period of its
existence, one presumes that all concerned would make every effort to ensure that the arrange-
ments on Council composition command a consensus, including in particular the support of
those states parties that are members of the group affected. The need to obtain the support
of such states is, if not explicitly stated, then certainly implicit in the new provision in Article
161, paragraph 2(c), which specifies that each group of states parties to be represented on
the Council is represented by those members, if any, which are nominated by the group.
169 DC(IT) Art. 308, para. 3. The President of the conference, recognizing the close links be-
tween this issue and the negotiations in the First Committee regarding the Council, solicited the
views of the Chairman of the First Committee on this matter during the resumed session. The
First Committee Chairman recommended that "there be no modifications in the text pending
further negotiations concerning article 161." It is possible to interpret that recommendation
as meaning either no change from the current ICNT, which contained no provision dealing
specifically with composition of the Council in connection with entry into force of the Con-
vention (ICNT/Rev.2 Art. 30 1), or no change from the clause recommended by the Chairman
of the Group of Legal Experts on Final Clauses. The President apparently chose the latter
interpretation. The collegium as a whole, of course, decided on all the new articles incorporated
into the DC(IT).
170 DC(IT) Art. 308, para. 1.
[Vol. 75
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
ditional 11 months in which to ratify in order to be parties when the Con-
vention enters into force.
Reservations
The conference has approached the question of reservations in a way
that reflects some basic differences between the emerging Convention on
the Law of the Sea and other multilateral treaties.
First, whatever their different priorities, most states have engaged in the
negotiations in a serious effort to make law on one point or another bind-
ing on other states. A major reason for seeking a rule of law in the first
place is a concern that in its absence behavior might not conform to a de-
sired norm, or any norm.
Permitting reservations would undermine these objectives with respect
to parties to the Convention. It would also weaken any potential argument
that the provision in question represents a rule of international law binding
on all states, whether or not they are party to the Convention. A major
maritime power could hardly be expected to agree to permitting reserva-
tions, for example, in derogation of basic navigational freedoms such as the
right of transit passage through straits.
Second, even if such a result were politically acceptable (which is very
doubtful), reservations to the most controversial part of the text-the deep
seabed mining regime and machinery-would generally not be possible or
efficacious for structural reasons. The organization and functions of the Au-
thority and the rules by which it operates must in principle be the same for
all.
The major practical function of a reservation to a text like the deep seabed
mining provisions is to make a statement on the record interpreting the text
or giving notice to the organization and the other parties of certain expec-
tations. Neither kind of statement is a true reservation. 171 Thus, to the extent
that the deep seabed mining regime is not one of the major positive fea-
tures in the Treaty for a particular state, a liberal attitude on true reserva-
tions will do nothing significant to improve that situation, but may well
undermine other provisions that state does find attractive.
Third, the very size and complexity of the Convention suggests only
superficially the possible desirability of permitting reservations. Peering be-
neath the surface, one finds in much-if not all-of the details "safeguards"
that were, and in most cases remain, a condition for agreement to more gen-
eral or "basic" provisions. Representing as it does the result of a long-term
shift in the law of the sea from a relatively "pure" dichotomy of regimes
based almost exclusively on either a territorial or a nationality (flag) con-
cept to a much more complex functionalism, in many respects the principles
171 Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc. AICONF.39127 (1969),
entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, reprinted in 63 AJIL 875 (1969), 8 ILM 679 (1969), a reserva-
tion is defined as "a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude
or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that
State." Art. 2(1)(d).
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and the detail of the Convention are inseparable. Indeed, at least in some
cases it may be said that the detail is its essence.
For these and related reasons, the general view in the conference was
that in principle reservations either should be prohibited or should be per-
mitted only in very limited and specified cases.
1 7 2
It was generally recognized that a negotiation on reservations is in fact a
negotiation on the substance of the issue dealt with by the article in question.
Accordingly, the text-following the general trend of debate- provides
that a reservation or exception may not be made "unless expressly permitted
by other articles" of the Convention. 3
This conservative approach to the question of reservations emerged to-
gether with a liberal view regarding declarations or statements that are not
properly regarded as true reservations under international law. Thus,
declarations or statements at the time of signature or ratification are per-
mitted without restriction as to name or purpose 74 so long as they "do not
2 An uninitiated observer listening to the debate might have reached a different con-
clusion, since a number of vocal speakers argued passionately in favor of some reservations.
Upon closer analysis, however, one recognized that a large majority of those speakers were
from one of two groups. Some spoke for delegations that have yet to reconcile themselves on
the record to particular provisions to which there is simply no chance that reervations would
be permitted (e.g., the 12-mile territorial sea, transit passage of straits, the protections for coastal
state fisheries interests). Others-indeed the more numerous group-are dceply engaged in
ongoing negotiations regarding delimitation of the economic zone and continental shelf be-
tween states with opposite or adjacent coasts. For substantive or tactical reat.ons, these dele-
gations do not wish to close the door on the possibility of reservations to the delimi-
tation articles (and perhaps to Article 121 on islands and rocks).
'73 The explanatory memorandum of the President states that, for an articlc to be construed
as permitting a reservation or exception, it must use the word. UN Doc. AIJCONF.62/L.58
(1980).
The reference to exceptions is-intended to cover the optional exceptions to the Conven-
tion's dispute settlement procedures set forth in Article 298. The reason for this reference to
"exceptions" is basically political, not legal. It serves as a reminder that the chapter on settle-
ment of disputes itself contains, as part of the substantive package, the functicnal analog to an
elaborate provision on reservations to that chapter.
The reference to exceptions also enables delegations that oppose all reservations to accept
the provision at present as drafted, since the final Convention (Art. 298) clearly will allow "ex-
ceptions" even if it does not allow reservations. Should there be no other article in the end
that specifically permits reservations, the reference to exceptions preserves he technical ac-
curacy of this article and thus could help save the conference from the potentially difficult
task (albeit not the technical desirability) of achieving consensus on changing the text and
deleting the cross-reference to other articles at the last minute. None of thcse political con-
siderations, of course, may justify confusing reservations and exceptions from the perspective
of legal draftsmanship.
A footnote states that the "article can be regarded only as provisional pending the conclu-
sion of discussion on outstanding substantive issues such as that relating to the delimitation
of maritime zones as between adjacent and opposite States and to settlement of disputes
thereon, where the final solution might include provision for reservations" The footnote
also states that the article is based on the assumption that the Convention will be adopted by
consensus. Delimitation issues aside, the reference to consensus in this context ts understood by
some delegations to mean that the so-called transitional provision will not appear in the
Convention.
174 Including, but not limited to, "the harmonization of national laws and regulations with
the provisions of" the Convention.
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purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of the provisions of this
Convention in their application to that State Party."' 75
Relation to Other International Agreements
The question of the effect of the new Convention on earlier treaties and
of later agreements on the Convention, where the same states are party to
both, is rife with legal complexity. The new texts17 6 deal with three general
classes of agreements.
(1) Agreements, existing or future, "expressly permitted or preserved by other
articles" of the Convention. Such agreements are not affected by the rules in the
new article on this subject. There are many examples of such agreements
in the text, perhaps the most frequently cited being bilateral agreements de-
limiting the economic zone or continental shelf between states with opposite
or adjacent coasts.
1 7
(2) Existing agreements. The Law of the Sea Convention would not alter
rights and obligations under existing agreements:
" compatible with the Law of the Sea Convention, and
" that do not affect the enjoyment by other states parties of their
rights or the performance of their obligations under the Law of the Sea
Convention.
This rule states the basic principles regarding the effect of a later treaty on
an earlier one. The text is derived from the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.
7,
(3) Agreements made subsequent to the Law of the Sea Convention. No
problem arises with respect to an agreement made subsequent to the Law of
the Sea Convention if that agreement is compatible with the Convention and
does not affect the rights and obligations of other parties. A problem would
arise, however, if some of the parties to the Law of the Sea Convention
agreed to modify or suspend any of its provisions as among themselves only.
As in the Vienna Convention,17 9 there are two conditions such agreements
must satisfy in order to protect the rights of other states parties:
* they must not relate to provisions of the Convention derogation
from which is incompatible with the effective execution of the object
and purpose of the Convention; and
* they must not affect the enjoyment by other states parties of their
rights or the performance of their obligations under the Convention.'"
17' DC(IT) Art. 310. This text is derived from the definition of a reservation in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, note 171 supra.
a DC(IT) Art. 311.
Set id.- Arts. 74, para. 4 and 84, para. 4.
17' Supra note 171, Art. 30. The rule regarding third parties is drawn from Art. 41(1)(b)
rather than from Art. 30(4)(b).
17. Art. 41.
I' This provision also states that such agreements "shall not affect the application of the basic
principles embodied in this Convention." DC(IT) Art. 311, para. 3. This confusing clause does
not Neem to add anything not already contained in the two conditions. If the clause is re-
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Two special rules are added. The first specifies that the new Convention
"shall prevail, as between States Parties, over the Geneva Conventions on the
Law of the Sea of 1958. " 1"1 The second rule provides, "The States Parties
to this Convention agree that there can be no amendments to the basic
principle relating to the common heritage of mankind set forth in article
136 and that they shall not be party to any agreement in derogation
thereof."i 2 This provision was added in an effort to accommodate some of
the concerns of delegations that unsuccessfully sought a provision declaring
the common heritage principle to be a peremptory norm of international
law.1s3 It applies expressly only to the "States Parties to this Convention"
in order to emphasize the fact that it does not address the rights of states
under international law and is not generally regarded as declaratory of, or
designed to create, a peremptory norm under, customary international
law.184
Amendments and Denunciation
The question of amendments involves reconciling the desire for stability
and uniformity that provides a major impetus for ratifying the Convention
with the undoubted need for some flexibility and responsiveness to change.
The problem of preserving consensus lies at the heart of the matter. There
are a wealth of interests shared by only a few states that are protected by
one or another provision of the Convention. For these states, such provi-
sions are a critical part of the overall consensus package.
Three techniques for dealing with the problem were considered by the
conference. First, one can specify procedures applicable to the adoption
(preparation) and entry into force of amendments that encourage consen-
sus, or that otherwise make it difficult to ignore interests specifically affected
by an amendment simply because they are shared only by a minority of
states. However, to the extent flexibility is the relevant consideration, one
would have to stop short of a rigid requirement of universal ratification
tamined, the use of the term "shall not" distinguishes it from the term "do not," which appears
before the two conditions for such agreements, and therefore provides the textual basis for
concluding that it is an elaboration on the effect of the two conditions rather than an addi-
tional condition.
1I This text emerged from a surprisingly unemotional and nonideological debate about the
value of the 1958 Geneva Conventions in general. The text means that the new Convention
prevails in its entirety over the old, but that it is properly interpreted against the background
of the 1958 Geneva Conventions, which constituted either the basis or the point of departure
for most of the new Convention.
182 DC(IT) Art. 311, para. 6.
1'3See 74 AJIL at 38-40; Vienna Convention, note 171 supra, Arts. 53, 64.
184 It also does not restrict the right of parties to the Convention to be party to prior or future
agreements regarding deep seabed mining so long as the agreements are applied in a manner
that does not derogate from the provisions of Article 136 and that is consistent with the gen-
eral rules set forth in Article 311 regarding other agreements. An interesting question could
conceivably arise regarding commodity agreements that have an effect (albeit indirect) on sea-
bed production or prices to which the Authority is not a party. It is possible that upon reflec-
tion this tempered the enthusiasm for ajus cogens provision among land-based producers of
minerals.
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before the amendment could enter into force. Moreover, with respect to
specially affected interests, there is a technical problem in attempting to
catalog in advance all the particular interests specially affected by particu-
lar provisions of the Convention.
Second, one can provide that an amendment only enters into force for
those states that ratify it. A state's interests in controlling any alteration in its
treaty obligations are thus protected. However, its interests in the overall
stability and uniformity of the law of the sea are not. Over time it could be-
come difficult to resist a majority practice legitimized by an amendment.
Moreover, this technique is not available where the same rules must apply to
all parties for structural reasons.
Third, the right of a state to denounce the Convention can be set forth so
as to operate as a restraint on the willingness of others to adopt an amend-
ment. This is a blunt instrument that is undoubtedly effective in averting
serious prejudice to a major interest. It is not the most desirable technique
for "fine tuning" routine amendments.
The Convention applies all three techniques. It expressly confirms the
right of a state to denounce the Convention on 1 year's notice. 185 Thus,
the third technique is available, if need be, to discourage all adverse amend-
ments and other actions.
The first two techniques are also applied, but in different ways to two
different categories:
(1) "amendments other than those relating to activities in the Area.";
and
(2) "amendments relating exclusively to activities in the Area."
"Activities in the Area" is a defined term that refers to deep seabed mining
(seaward of the continental shelf).'8 6 The two categories of amendments
are mutually exclusive with no overlap.
18 7
Amendments other than those concerning deep seabed mining. With respect to
this first category of amendments, a state party may request that a con-
ference of states parties be convened to consider "specific amendments"
once the Convention has been in force for more than 10 years. 88 The
'~' DC(IT) Art. 317.
', "Activities in the Area" is defined as "all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of,
the resources of the 'Area."' DC(IT) Art. 1. The "Area" is defined as the seabed and ocean
floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Ibid. While this is generally
understood to mean the seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of the continental shelf, as de-
fined in Article 76 (except pursuant to Article 121(3) in the case of certain rocks), the Drafting
Committee is still considering the matter.
17 The first category applies to amendments relating only to matters other than activities in
the Area. The absence of the word "exclusively" from the first category is correct. It would be
incorrect to state that the first category applies to amendments other than those relating "ex-
clusively" to activities in the Area, as this would permit the procedures applicable to the first
category to be used for "mixed" amendments to circumvent the procedures applicable to the
second category. While the text of the DC(IT) is accurate, one could also delete the word "ex-
clusively" from the second category without changing the meaning.
I", DC(IT) Art. 312, para. 1.
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amendment conference would be convened if a majority of states parties
respond affirmatively to the request within 12 months. Its decision-making
procedures would be the same as those applicable at the current Law of the
Sea Conference, expressly including the requirement contained in the
Gentleman's Agreement189 that the "conference should make every effort
to reach agreement on any amendments by way of consensus and there
should be no voting on such matters until all efforts at consensus have been
exhausted."190
Alternatively, an amendment in the first category may be circulated di-
rectly to states parties for adoption by a simplified procedure without con-
vening a conference and without any 10-year delay. If within 12 months no
state party objects to the proposed amendment or its adoption by a simpli-
fied procedure, then it is considered adopted. 191
In either case, amendments are subject to ratification.1 9' The amendment
enters into force only for the states ratifying it, after it has been ratified by
two-thirds, but not less than 60, of the states parties.1 93
There was substantial support for the idea of adding qualitative require-
ments for entry into force of amendments affecting particular interests of
various categories of states, but the endeavor proved difficult and complex.
Instead, the consensus requirement was added to the provision on confer-
ence procedures, and the question of additional requirements for entry into
force was left to be dealt with in connection with the negotiation of the
amendment itself, at which time it would be easier to ascertain the precise
effect of the amendment on different groups. Thus, an amendment may
specify a "larger number of ratifications" for its entry into force than the
minimum required by the Convention itself.1 94
Deep seabed mining amendments. With respect to deep seabed mining, the
main question concerned the possible need for amendments during the
approximately 20 years prior to the review conference provided for in the
deep seabed mining texts.1 95 The Sea-Bed Authority was considered the ap-
propriate place to consider such amendments in light of its expertise and
because its decision-making procedures were being designed to protect all
relevant interests.
Accordingly, a state party may propose an amendment relating to deep
seabed mining at any time. It would be referred to the Council of the Au-
thority, and would be considered adopted only if the identical text were
approved by both the Council and the Assembly.196 Consensus is required
for approval of amendments in the Council.1 97 Before approving an amend-
19 Appended to the Rules of Procedure, UN Doc. A/CONF.621301Rev.2 (1976), reprinted in
73 AJIL 3 n. 11.
90 DC(IT) Art. 312, para. 2. 19UId., Art. 313.
192 Id., Art. 315, para. 2. See note 160 supra.
193 DC(IT) Art. 316, para. 1.
'94 Given its negotiating history as an effort to accommodate those favoring qualitative re-
quirements, the term "larger number" is properly understood to refer to qualitative as well as
quantitative requirements additional to those specified in the Convention.
1'9 DC(IT) Art. 155. 'KId., Art. 314.
9 rId., Art. 161, para. 7(d).
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ment, the Council and the Assembly must determine that it does not
prejudice the system of exploration and exploitation pending the review
conference.
Seabed mining amendments, like all others, are subject to ratification.
198
However, by their very nature, they must enter into force for all parties at
the same time. The Authority cannot function under different treaty pro-
visions with respect to different states.
Accordingly, if a seabed mining amendment approved by the Council and
the Assembly is ratified by three-fourths of the states parties, it enters into
force for all states parties 1 year later.199 The 1-year delay is designed to
give a state that has not ratified the amendment time to decide whether it
will ratify the amendment in accordance with its constitutional procedures,
allow the amendment to enter into force for it without ratification, or de-
nounce the Convention.
20 0
Participation and the Transitional Provision
At the suggestion of its President, the conference deferred debate on the
question whether entities other than states may become party to the Conven-
tion and on the fate of the "transitional provision" that currently appears
after the text of the Convention.2 1 The author's earlier discussion of the
substance of these problems need not be repeated here.
2 2
There is some evidence that the European Economic Community is trying
to find a way to deal with the problem of reciprocity of obligations that
might arise if an economic community (not necessarily the European Com-
munity) is a part) to the Convention with respect to matters within its
competence, but one of the member states of the community is not a party
to the Convention (with respect to matters that remain within its compe-
tence).
With respect to liberation movements, it should be recalled that 60 ratifi-
cations are required for entry into force of the Convention. Many states will
wish to review the rules, regulations, and procedures drafted by the Pre-
paratory Commission before deciding on ratification. Thus, it is unlikely
that the Convention will enter into force before the mid- 1980's. Under these
9'Id., Art. 315, para. 2.
"" Amendments to Annex VI, the Statute of the Law of the Sea Tribunal, also enter into
force for all states parties. Such amendments can only be adopted by consensus at a con-
ference or by the simplified "no objection" procedure, or, in the case of the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber, by the procedure applicable to seabed mining amendments. DC(IT) Ann. VI,
Art. 42.
" There was also some private discussion of whether states could withdraw their instru-
ments of ratification during the I-year period in order to avert denunciation of the Conven-
tion by others. One suggestion was that it might be prudent for seabed mining amendments
to contain a provision authorizing the Council of the Authority to delay their implementation
where necessary to avoid prejudice to the effectiveness or universality of the Convention, or
simply authorizing the Council to fix the date for their application after their entry into force.
"I1 The transitional provision accordingly is not a part of the Convention pursuant to Article
318, which incorporates only the annexes by reference.
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circumstances, is it not possible to view an insistence that liberation move-
ments be allowed to become parties as a tacit admission that they are not
expected to be in any different position by the mid-1980's? Is this not
political reason enough to avoid pressing the issue?
Supporters of the Convention face a difficult battle for ratification, given
the widespread fears regarding the Sea-Bed Authority. They cannot afford
to antagonize those who as a matter of principle or politics are unlikely
to support a treaty with liberation movements in general or the Palestine
Liberation Organization in particular. What is needed is a solution that
frees the Convention of these issues while giving maximum possible scope
to the expression of political sentiments regarding national liberation and
decolonization. One may speculate that possible elements of such a solution
might include the following:
* Along with states, regional economic communities to which
states have transferred competence and certain associated states could
be parties to the Convention. The relevant legal instrument for de-
termining whether they have the necessary internal and external com-
petences would be the constitutive agreements with or among states,
be it the agreements establishing an economic community or the agree-
ments defining the basic relationship between a state and an associated
state.
* Observers at the conference would in principle be accorded simi-
lar status in organs established by the Convention such as the Assembly
of the Sea-Bed Authority.
* A resolution adopted by consensus would affirm the obligations
of states with respect to the lawful inhabitants of areas under foreign
occupation and dependent territories, in particular as regards the
natural resources of the territorial sea, economic zone, and continental
shelf.
VIII. THE DRAFTING COMMITTEE
During the ninth session, and a 3-week meeting in New York in June,
the Drafting Committee continued and largely completed its work on har-
monization of terms identified in various papers prepared at its request by
the Secretariat.203 This work was conducted through the six language
groups, with the Chairman of the committee and the coordinators of the
language groups endeavoring to work out generally acceptable results.
The exercise was productive. However, it revealed considerable reluc-
tance to change the text. This reluctance continues as the Drafting Com-
mittee now undertakes an article-by-article textual review in six languages.
The result is certain to be a document with a number of legal drafting prob-
lems about which nothing has been done. The United States delegation
203 The reports of the Drafting Committee are in UN Docs. A/CONF.62/L.40 (1979), L.56,
L.57/Rev.1, and L.63/Rev.1 and Corr.1 (1980). The conference documents containing the re-
ports of the six language groups were initially identified by the symbol LGDC, but
soon were divided as follows: ALGDC (Arabic), CLGDC (Chinese), ELGDC (English), FLGDC
(French), RLGDC (Russian), and SLGDC (Spanish). This article was completed prior to the
meeting of the committee that began Jan. 12, 1981.
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drew attention to this point, noting the routine clause that the text is equally
authentic in all six languages20 4 and the assumptions regarding the nature
of the work in the Drafting Committee that lay behind such a clause.
Almost ever), article not copied verbatim from another treaty was negotiated
in English and translated into the other languages by the Secretariat after
the fact, in many cases very rapidly at the end of a session.
The Drafting Committee will not easily find solutions to the many prob-
lems of harmonization, concordance, and consistency that exist throughout
the text. The resulting situation may inevitably yield a rule for interpreting
this large and complex Convention not far removed from the following for-
mulation suggested lightheartedly by one participant: the use of the same
terms in different places does not necessarily indicate that the same meaning
is intended; the use of different terms in different places does not neces-
sarily indicate that a different meaning is intended.
IX. CONCLUSION: THE PREAMBLE
During the first part of the ninth session, the Informal Plenary devoted
several meetings to the Preamble. Views were divided between those who
preferred a short preamble such as that contained in the ICNT and those
who preferred a longer and more philosophical preamble.
20 5
The Preamble ultimately adopted contains a succinct statement of the im-
mediate purposes of the "legal order for the seas and oceans" established by
the Convention. It begins with a reference to facilitating the traditional
uses of the seas for international communication. For the first time in a
global international convention of this sort, it mentions not only "equity"
but "efficiency" as the purpose of that legal order with respect to utiliza-
tion of ocean resources.206 It expressly affirms that the achievement of "such
goals"-including in addition the "study, protection and preservation of the
marine environment" -will "contribute to the realization of ajust and equi-
table international economic order." The view that there is an inherent
contradiction among these various objectives is thus rejected.
07
U4 DC(IT) Art. 320.
101 The concern of the former group was that the negotiation of a long preamble could re-
vive and stimulate ideological disputes and bog down in efforts by delegations to color the
interpretation of the substantive articles. The structural accommodation successfully pursued
by the President involved a somewhat longer preamble than in the ICNT, but on the under-
standing that objectionable "code words" could not be used, and that the Preamble could not
reflect or emphasize only one point of view.
20 While economists may differ as to whether all aspects of the Convention are fully con-
sistent with those goals, the important point is that to the extent the Preamble is a guide to the
values to be applied in interpreting the text of the Convention, those values include both
equity and efficiency in utilization of ocean resources.
' Two interesting drafting problems arose. One concerned the verb to be used in referring
to the principles contained in the Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and Ocean
Floor, and the Sub-soil thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, GA Res. 2749
(XXV) (1970). The declaration calls for a convention to "give effect" to the principles. Some
countries feared that the use of such a term might be interpreted to imply that the principles
can be ignored pending entry into force of the Convention. The conference settled naturally
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Perhaps the most important clause in the Preamble is the reminder that
the underlying purpose of a convention setting forth basic rules of law and
dispute settlement mechanisms binding on all is to "contribute to the
strengthening of peace, security, co-operation and friendly relations among
all -nations."
Members of the legal profession, particularly those learned in the history
and philosophy of law, might well regard such a statement as obvious and
trite. Yet the debate on the Convention, even in the United States and
some Western European countries, is so barren of reference to the values
inherent in law and order as to raise disquieting doubts about the commit-
ment to these traditional Western values. Public order is a basic requirement,
even (or perhaps especially) for rational economic man.
The weight to be accorded these considerations will determi ne the fate of
the Convention. Such values were central to the extraordinary moral leader-
ship of the conference demonstrated by its late President, Ambassador
Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe.
enough on the verb summum bonum: "Desiring by this Convention to develop the principles em-
bodied in" the declaration (emphasis added).
The second problem concerned the ICNT preambular clause that matters n-ot regulated by
the Convention continue to be governed by "customary international law." While the substance
of the principle was generally acceptable, in the course of the technical redrafting the term was
changed to "general international law" because a few delegations from newly independent
countries had a philosophical aversion to the implication of antiquity in the word "customary."
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